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Abstract 
 In the Summer of 1864, Confederate General Robert E. Lee tasked Major General 
Jubal Early to protect the Army of Northern Virginia’s rear by defending the strategically 
vital Shenandoah Valley from Union conquest. By the Fall, Early was losing decisively, 
hopelessly outnumbered, and making no strategic refinements. He never seriously 
attempted to synchronize his Valley operations with Colonel John S. Mosby’s nearby 43rd 
Ranger Battalion, despite ominous reversals and Mosby’s attempts to cooperate. 
 Mosby was a gifted tactician who patterned his actions after his revolutionary 
hero, Brigadier General Francis Marion. He achieved his dream of being a “partisan” like 
Marion by organizing and leading Virginians behind enemy lines in hit-and-run raids 
against the Bluecoats. Like Early, the Patriot Major General Nathanael Greene had been 
significantly outmatched in the Carolinas in 1780. He had turned the tables on the British 
with a plan that combined European-style pitched battles with guerilla raids. 
 Greene strategically defeated Major General Charles Cornwallis’ Redcoats in 
1781 by providing partisans like Marion with clear direction and a sense of purpose. He 
recognized Marion’s skill and provided him with written orders to provide intelligence, 
attack supply lines, and suppress Loyalists. By contrast, Early never nested Mosby’s 
Rangers into his operations, even when defeat appeared obvious. Greene had created 
opportunities with a spirit of humility and cooperation in 1780; in 1864, Early denied 
Mosby’s nearby Rangers any real opportunities to effectively influence his forlorn 
conventional strategy against Major General Phillip Sheridan’s vastly larger army.          
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
“Guerilla warfare” is integral to world and US military history. Military theorist 
Max Boot describes “guerilla,” or “irregular” warfare as “hit-and-run tactics by an armed 
group directed primarily against a government and its security forces for political or 
religious reasons.” The term “guerilla” originated from Spain’s “petite guerre,” or small 
war (1808-1814) against Napoleon’s army. Patriot Brigadier General Francis Marion and 
Confederate Colonel John S. Mosby perfected guerilla warfare during the American 
Revolution (1775-1783) and Civil War (1861-1865). They were “partisans”—officially-
sanctioned officers who assisted regular armies by organizing and leading local 
inhabitants in attacks against the flanks and rear of enemy armies. As “partisans” they 
optimized “asymmetric tactics”—attacks calculated for maximum “political and 
informational impact” with the lowest possible risk for the insurgents. Their vastly 
outmatched rebel governments adopted “hybrid strategies” that combined conventional 
and asymmetric warfare to compensate for material inferiority. Their political and 
military leaders, however, reflected different societies and national goals. Most historians 
agree that the Confederacy’s unbending dedication to the status quo was fundamentally 
less democratic than the Patriots’ “Whig” ideology.1 A divergence of ideological goals 
                                                 
1Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of 
the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 58; Andrew J. Birtle, 
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 23; Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1984), 479-483; 
Walter Laqueur, Guerilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), xvi-xvii; In Invisible Armies: An Epic History of 
Guerilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation, 2013), 78; During the American Revolution, “Whig” became synonymous 
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partially explains why Patriot Major General Nathanael Greene embraced partisan 
warfare during his 1780 Southern Campaign, while Confederate Major General Jubal 
Early avoided unconventional tactics in Northern Virginia in 1864. Greene and Early 
both lacked experience as independent commanders, but Early’s choices clearly reflected 
more conservative ideals. Greene was more willing to pursue a hybrid strategy and 
proactively coordinate his efforts with available partisans. Was Greene more realistic 
than Early? Might Greene’s example have been instructive to Early?  Could Early have 
succeeded by using every available option, including Mosby’s command?  
Primary accounts from prominent Whig participants of the Southern Campaign 
elucidate Marion’s importance to the success of Greene’s hybrid strategy. There are a 
number of excellent primary accounts concerning the guerilla war in the South. Greene’s 
Papers are a compilation of his letters, reports, and war correspondence that cover his 
leadership and cooperation with Marion and other partisans. William Dobein James’ A 
Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and a History of His Brigade (1821) is 
the only complete primary account of Marion’s Brigade from a partisan who joined 
Marion at the age of fifteen. While James’ timeline is occasionally confused, his narrative 
combines his own eyewitness accounts and fellow soldiers’ reminiscences. General 
Henry “Lighthorse Harry” Lee’s Memoirs provide an account of Marion’s operations 
from one of the war’s most competent leaders. Lee describes his cooperation with 
Marion, including raids, strategic choices, tactics, and his own assessment of Marion. The 
Papers of South Carolina Governor John Rutledge, Henry Laurens, William Davie, and 
                                                 
with “Patriot,” while “Tory” became synonymous with “Loyalism,” or loyalty to Great 
Britain. 
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James Iredell contextualize the southern war and the impact of Marion’s actions. General 
Peter Horry, Marion’s cavalry commander, wrote “transcripts” for the novelist Mason 
Locke “Parson” Weems for an early-nineteenth-century biography of Marion. Although 
Weems’ subsequent work is of little historical value, Horry’s transcripts provide detailed 
accounts of Marion’s guerilla raids. The Documentary History of the American 
Revolution, William Gibbes, ed., also provides much of Marion’s war correspondence. 
Unwearied Patience and Fortitude: Francis Marion’s Orderly Book, Patrick O’Kelley, 
ed., provides invaluable information and commentaries on Marion’s command 
philosophy, discipline, and operations. General William Moultrie and the Whig politician 
Dr. David Ramsay’s American Revolutionary narratives additionally provide excellent 
background that highlight Marion’s major contributions. 
 Primary British actors provide a contrastingly negative account of Marion’s 
Brigade. The Cornwallis Papers: The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in The Southern 
Theatre of the American Revolutionary War, Ian Saberton ed., is a compilation of the 
correspondence of British General Lord Charles Cornwallis, who commanded British 
forces during the entire Southern Campaign. Cornwallis’ Papers span from the opening 
of the Siege of Charleston on April 1, 1780, to his surrender at Yorktown on October 19, 
1781. His military correspondence dramatically recounts how Marion’s attacks on 
Loyalists, outposts, and supply lines ground British operations to a halt. Other key British 
sources include post-war histories authored by General Banastre Tarleton, Cornwallis’ 
cavalry commander; General Henry Clinton, the overall North American British 
commander and architect of the Southern Campaign; and Charles Stedman, Cornwallis’ 
commissary general. The Memoirs of southern Loyalists like Alexander Chesney and 
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Roger Lamb describe how Revolutionary irregular militia gained the upper hand in the 
partisan war. Loyalist articles and editorials in the Royal Gazette (Charleston, S.C.), 
South Carolina and American General Gazette, and the South Carolina Gazette and 
American Journal, demonstrate crown supporters’ use of print media as 
counterpropaganda to the political impact of Marion’s raids. British newspapers like the 
London Gazette, as well as the Memoirs and Correspondence of Royal officials 
illuminate the partisans’ influence on domestic war support.2  
 Mosby’s success created a similar polarity of primary supporters and detractors.   
Confederate sources generally herald Mosby as a southern hero and symbol of defiance. 
The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR) contains the most 
important correspondence between General Robert E. Lee and his subordinate 
commanders, including Mosby. The OR details the extent of Mosby’s cooperation with 
Generals Lee and James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart, the impact of his raids, and the 
strategic relevance of guerilla warfare. Major Generals Jubal Early and John B. Gordon’s 
Memoirs provide useful information on Confederate strategic decisions and 
developments during the Shenandoah Valley Campaigns of 1864, as well as Early’s 
strategic thinking and decision not to utilize asymmetric warfare. Mosby’s Papers are at 
several locations, including the University of Virginia, the Virginia Historical Society, 
and the Library of Congress. They contain Mosby’s personal and military correspondence 
before, during, and after the war. The Letters of John S. Mosby, edited by Adele H. 
                                                 
2 Edmund Burke, The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, vol. 4, John A. Woods, ed. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 266-270, 382-390; Horace Walpole, 
The Last Journals of Horace Walpole, vol. 2, A. Francis Steuart, ed., 2nd ed. (New York: 
John Lane Company, 1910), 319-340; The London Gazette, 1780-1781. 
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Mitchell, provides important details on the creation of Mosby’s command, Lee and 
Stuart’s perception of partisans, and the Berryville Wagon Raid. Mosby’s War 
Reminiscences and Stuart’s Cavalry Campaigns (1887), Stuart’s Cavalry in the 
Gettysburg Campaign (1908), and The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby (1917) are 
Mosby’s essential reflections and reminiscences of his contribution to the war. 
Reminiscences focuses on his guerilla raids until June 1863; Stuart’s Cavalry covers his 
reconnaissance for Stuart prior to the battle of Gettysburg; Memoirs recounts his early 
life, enlistment, and details about his Valley exploits against Sheridan. Former Rangers 
including John Scott, John M. Crawford, John W. Munson, and John Alexander also 
wrote important Memoirs and Reminiscences that describe the aggressive operations and 
proliferation of Mosby’s 43rd Ranger Battalion throughout 1864. The Diaries of the war 
clerk JB Jones and the aristocrat Mary Boykin Chesnutt provide essential Confederate 
political commentaries regarding major strategic developments.  
 Northern sources underscore Mosby’s destructive impact on Union war aims. 
General Ulysses S. Grant and Major General Phillip Sheridan’s OR correspondence 
reveal how Mosby’s raids disrupted Sheridan’s Valley strategy, and what counter-guerilla 
operations he ultimately implemented. Grant and Sheridan’s Memoirs additionally 
provide general, if somewhat whitewashed accounts of Federal counterinsurgency efforts 
throughout Northern Virginia that omit details about their controversial retaliatory 
summary executions of guerillas. Hundreds of newspapers on both sides of the divide, 
but especially in New York and Richmond, amplify the political and informational 
impact of Mosby’s raids in the North and South. Eyewitness Union accounts that testify 
to the tactical élan and psychological dominance of Mosby’s Rangers include Frederic 
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Denison’s Sabres and Spurs: The First Regiment Rhode Island Cavalry in the Civil War, 
1861-1865 (1876), and Thomas W. Smith’s The Story of a Cavalry Regiment:“Scott’s 
900,” Eleventh New York Cavalry (1897). The Diaries of Union Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles and the attorney George Templeton Strong provide excellent insight into 
the war’s political impact on northern voters, as well as how the newspapers’ coverage of 
Union failures negatively affected Union morale. Like Marion, Mosby’s asymmetric 
raids exploited sensational press coverage and enemy hysteria to build an aura of 
invincibility that inspired and symbolized rebel resistance, while creating irrational fear 
and hatred among enemies. Their success in using their regional talents, resources, 
tactical skills, and surprise and fear as force multipliers, all originate from ancient 
guerilla warfare principles.    
Classic and modern military treatises, guerilla histories, and counterinsurgency 
manuals help to explain why Marion and Mosby’s campaigns were so effective. Carl Von 
Clausewitz’s On War (1832) provides excellent information on guerilla warfare theory. 
John Ellis’ A Short History of Guerilla Warfare (1976) provides a useful overview of 
irregular warfare from ancient to modern times. Walter Laqueur’s Guerilla Warfare: A 
Historical and Critical Study (1998) is an international narrative of guerilla warfare and 
insurgent theory throughout history with irregular warfare case studies, leaders, and their 
theories from ancient to modern times. Max Boot’s Invisible Armies: An Epic History of 
Guerilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present (2013) is another global history that 
provides vignettes of asymmetric warfare from biblical times to the present. Ian Beckett’s 
Encyclopedia of Guerilla Warfare (1999) is a reference work that provides encyclopedic 
summaries of guerilla leaders, techniques, and campaigns. Andrew J. Birtle’s U.S. Army 
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Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (1998) is a history 
of the evolution of American counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics from the Civil War 
to World War II. Birtle argues that principles transcend the evolution of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, and provides an excellent strategic overview of Federal 
counterinsurgency policy and execution pertaining to Mosby’s area of operations. Archer 
Jones’ The Art of War in the Western World (1987) explains how guerilla warfare fits 
within larger strategy. Finally, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual (2007), edited by Conrad Crane, is useful for defining modern guerilla, 
insurgent, and terrorist terms and theories. 
Francis Marion (1732-1795) was no terrorist. As a Continental officer, he led a 
guerilla force varying between sixteen and 1000 men in a campaign against enemy 
supply lines that upended British control of eastern South Carolina between August 1780 
and September 1781. Tradition has it that he became known as the “Swamp Fox” when 
British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton allegedly said “as for this damned old fox, 
the Devil himself could not catch him.”3 General Peter Horry unwittingly enabled the 
novelist Mason Locke “Parson” Weems to produce a mythologized neoclassical-style 
biography that portrayed him as the knightly “Washington of the South” in the early-
nineteenth-century. William Gilmore Simms’ subsequent biography only perpetuated 
Marion’s “knight in shining armor” legend spawned by Weems. Military historian Don 
Higginbotham points out that US military history of the later “Progressive-era” was 
                                                 
3 The “Low Country” describes the coastal wetland region of swamps, marshes, and 
interlocking creeks and rivers that roughly spans from Wilmington, N.C. in the north, to 
the Georgia sea-islands in the south, and inland roughly sixty miles; Hugh F. Rankin, 
Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973), 113. 
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dominated by soldier-historians who disparaged militia as unruly farmers. Post-World 
War II Revolutionary War monographs, however, provided increasingly objective 
analyses of partisan exploits, and in 1973 historian Hugh F. Rankin’s Francis Marion: 
The Swamp Fox became Marion’s first professional biography. Rankin argued that 
Marion’s life was “like a sandwich—a highly spiced center between two slabs of rather 
dry bread,” and that he was “a natural partisan leader and was able to utilize a relatively 
small striking force to its greatest potential—his primary weapon was the element of 
surprise.” His overall positive account conceded that the ruthless Swamp Fox was no 
“knight in shining armor.”4 Rankin and other post-World War II historians acknowledge 
irregular militia’s importance. While historians like Wayne Lee blame the militia’s poor 
organizational structure for the South’s violent war of reprisals, none deny that 
Continental military success was enabled by cooperative partisans.5   
                                                 
4 Peter Horry and M.L. Weems, The Life of General Francis Marion (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott & Co., 1857), v; William G. Simms, The Partisan: A Romance of the 
Revolution. 2nd ed. (New York: Redfield, 1854), 45-46; Don Higginbotham, The War of 
American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New 
York: MacMillan, 1971), 360-369; Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1952); Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Rankin, Francis Marion, ix, 298-299. 
5 See John Oller, The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution 
(Boston: Da Capo Press, 2016), prologue; John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The 
British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782, 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of 
Alabama Press, 2003), 50-55; Lawrence E. Babits and Joshua Howard’s Long, Obstinate, 
and Bloody: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009), 10-12; Mark V. Kwasny, Washington’s Partisan War, 1775-1783 
(Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996) xi-xv; Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in 
Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot and War (Gainseville: 
University Press of Florida, 2001); Robert Pugh, “The Revolutionary Militia in the 
Southern Campaign, 1780-1781,” The William and Mary Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 
1957): 154-175; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military 
Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
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John Singleton Mosby (1833-1916) was deeply influenced early by Weems’ 
literature and successfully applied the Swamp Fox’s principles during the Civil War. 
Despite the praise of Generals Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and Phillip Sheridan, 
Mosby’s military genius was overshadowed by defeat. He was engulfed by a volatile 
mixture of northern novels and films that portrayed him as a villain and “Lost Cause” 
entertainment that glorified his exploits. Historians Paul Ashdown and Edward Caudill 
explain that his myth arose because he “inspire[d]…interest in the press and, later, in 
film, novels, television, and even among scholars.”6 The second-order effect of the terror 
that Rangers created in Union soldiers’ minds was that Mosby became a bogeyman 
among many northerners. The dime novel Jack Mosby, the Guerilla (1864) portrays 
Mosby as a nefarious pirate who tortures prisoners and tries to burn New York City by 
setting a phosphorous-soaked bed ablaze in the Astor House Hotel. Subsequent novels 
like Surry of Eagle’s Nest (1866) and Mosby’s Night Hawk (1931) conversely portray 
Mosby as a noble and heroic partisan. Mosby and several former Rangers wrote Memoirs 
to attempt to set the record straight.7 The journalist Virgil Carrington Jones finally wrote 
his first professional biography, Ranger Mosby (1944), which emphasized Civil War 
                                                 
6 Paul Ashdown and Edward Caudill, The Mosby Myth: A Confederate Hero in Life and 
Legend (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), xxiii-xxviii, 7.  
7 Unknown, Jack Mosby, The Guerilla Chief (New York: T. Dawley, 1864), chapter 1, 
36, http://galenet.galegroup.com; John Esten Cooke, Surry of Eagle’s Nest; or, The 
Memoirs of a Staff Officer Serving in Virginia (Ridgewood: Gregg Press, 1866), chapter 
1; Ashdown and Caudhill, The Mosby Myth, xxiii-xxviii, 148; John S. Mosby, Mosby’s 
War Reminiscences and Stuart’s Cavalry Campaigns (New York: Pageant Book Co, 
1958); John S. Mosby, Stuart’s Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign (New York: Moffat, 
1908); John S. Mosby, The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby, 2nd ed. (Nashville: J.S 
Sanders & Company, 1997); John Scott, Partisan Life with Col. John S. Mosby (New 
York: Harper & Bros, 1867); Joseph Williamson, Mosby’s Rangers: A Record of the 
Operations of the Forty-Third Battalion Virginia Cavalry, from Its Organization to the 
Surrender, from the Diary of a Private (New York: R.B. Kenyon, 1896).  
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actions and was based on family and soldier interviews and correspondence. Jones’s 
biography and subsequent broader monograph on guerillas are considered credible by 
modern historians.  Historian Bruce Catton asserted that Civil War histories prior to Jones 
had portrayed guerilla warfare as a “colorful, annoying, but largely unimportant side 
issue.” More professional analyses of guerilla warfare emerged in the 1980s, despite the 
continued insistence by historians like Gerald Linderman that all Confederate guerillas, 
including Mosby, were simply considered vermin by regular soldiers.8  
Kevin H. Siepel’s professional biography Rebel: The Life and Times of John 
Singleton Mosby (1983) argues that had Mosby “fought on the winning side, he would 
undoubtedly be remembered as a national hero.” Jeffry D. Wert’s Mosby’s Rangers: The 
True Adventures of the Most Famous Command of the Civil War (1990), is a 43rd Ranger 
Battalion military history that asserts that Mosby’s Rangers were effective but did not 
alter the course of the war. James A. Ramage’s subsequent biography, Gray Ghost: The 
Life of Col. John Singleton Mosby (1999), argues that his personality and talent for 
ruthless tactics made him the ultimate partisan leader. Paul Ashdown and Edward 
Caudill’s The Mosby Myth: A Confederate Hero in Life and Legend (2002) academically 
assesses Mosby’s complex legacy by asserting that the “Mosby Myth continues to 
intrigue us because it represents something grandly irrepressible and yet paradoxical in 
the American spirit.”9 While these historians refuse to admit that Mosby strategically 
                                                 
8 Virgil C. Jones, Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1944); Virgil C. Jones, Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders (New York: Holt, 1956); Gerald 
F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War 
(New York: The Free Press, 1987), 197-201. 
9 Kevin H. Siepel, Rebel: The Life and Times of John Singleton Mosby (New York: Saint 
Martin’s Press, 1983), xii; Wert, Mosby’s Rangers: The True Adventures of the Most 
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altered the war, historian James McPherson argues that “guerillas forced Sheridan to 
detach a third of his front-line force and prevented him from carrying out Grant’s original 
orders to move east across the Blue Ridge and come up on Lee’s rear at Petersburg.” Per 
Donald Sutherland’s A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American 
Civil War (2009), “guerillas…changed the nature of the war” by increasing the violence 
and length of the conflict, which convinced Union policymakers to adopt a “hard war” 
policy against civilians. The current academic rub is between historians like Siepel, who 
contend that guerillas benefited southern war aims; and those like Sutherland, who 
counter that partisans exacerbated southern defeat by provoking reprisals. More than 
revolutionary partisans, the emotional debate over the legitimacy of Confederate 
partisans continues amid the expansion of guerilla scholarship.10  
Was Mosby irreconcilable with southern strategy, or did the Confederacy fail to 
recognize a good thing when they saw it? Mosby’s greatest strength as a partisan was his 
lack of West Point training, which his mentor Stuart, and eventually Lee seemed to 
recognize. Both the British and the Union naturally overreacted to partisan raids by 
abusing and alienating that very same population on whose support the British, but not so 
much Union success relied. Cornwallis’ overuse of blunt force effectively strengthened 
Marion, who enabled Greene to clear the Carolinas. Mosby defied great odds with 
remarkable talent, but was excluded from the West Point elite’s losing team. 
                                                 
Famous Command of the Civil War, 22; James A. Ramage, Gray Ghost: The Life of Col. 
John Singleton Mosby, 2nd ed. (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 2-6. 
10 James McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction. 4th ed. (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 2010), 479; Ramage, Gray Ghost, xxxii-xxxiii; Daniel E. 
Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), x-xiii, 277-279. 
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Furthermore, the scope of his raids was ultimately too limited to weaken the Union Army 
sufficiently to change the war’s outcome. Like Marion, Mosby went asymmetric because 
he fought from a position of weakness. Both leaders excelled at taking small tactical bites 
with lightning raids at places of their time and choosing to politically and militarily 
weaken their foes. Their victories sparked fear in their enemies, increased popular 
operational support for their cause, and expanded their territorial control among the 
disaffected. Mosby’s rise by unconventional means was perceived as a threat by jealous 
elements within the elitist Confederate power structure and was a bad omen for the 
South. Both Marion and Mosby brilliantly destabilized enemy occupation forces, but 
Marion’s success was leveraged by Greene; Mosby’s triumphs were ignored by Early. 
The contrast between Patriot and Confederate war aims becomes clearer when one 
compares Greene, the resourceful blacksmith’s son who deliberately leveraged guerilla 
warfare as an effective tool; and Early, a haughty West Pointer and attorney who 
arrogantly refused to deploy guerillas. Greene deliberately enabled Marion to create the 
conditions to reverse the balance of power. Mosby’s skill and potential was ignored, yet 
among Confederate commanders, he alone retained the tactical initiative amid southern 
defeat. Why did the Confederacy and General Early disregard Mosby’s strategic potential 
at such a critical juncture of the war? 
 I propose to compare Marion’s ambush of Major Robert McLeroth at Halfway 
Swamp on December 12, 1780 with Mosby’s ambush of Sheridan’s wagon train at 
Berryville on August 13, 1864, to prove that the Confederate elitist mindset, as 
manifested by Early’s unwise refusal to embrace hybrid warfare, contributed to the 
Confederate loss of the Valley and ultimate defeat. By first contextualizing eighteenth 
13 
 
 
 
and nineteenth-century U.S. notions of virtuous warfare, and then comparing Greene’s 
humble incorporation of Marion into his hybrid strategy with Early’s refusal to fully 
utilize Mosby’s talents, I will reveal that the Confederate establishment valued form over 
strategic function. The first chapter will establish that Marion and Mosby were similar 
high-caliber partisans by chronicling their efficient and practical application of guerilla 
principles within the context of unique historical, regional, socioeconomic, technological, 
political, and strategic conditions. The second chapter will explain how Marion’s 
historically misunderstood ambush of Major Robert McLeroth on December 12, 1780 at 
Halfway Swamp tipped the scales to create a regional power shift which enabled his 
unit’s transition into the conventional regional power, and thereby facilitated Greene’s 
successful campaign. This chapter will explain why Marion’s small raid within Greene’s 
well-defined and unified strategy added to the cumulative effect of previous raids to 
trigger the critical mass necessary to shift the southern balance of power. The third 
chapter will explain why Mosby’s brilliant Berryville supply train ambush on August 13, 
1864, represented a strategic windfall that was squandered by a besieged war department 
whose dedication to the status quo was reflected by Early’s determined refusal to 
embrace hybrid warfare. The humble Greene would never have understood Early’s over-
inflated elitist pride which influenced his decision to remain inflexible in the face of 
certain defeat.   
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CHAPTER 2 
The Underdogs of War: How the Southern Partisans Francis Marion And John S. Mosby 
Offset Weakness by Leveraging Their Strengths 
                                                              
 United States military history was once characterized by practical solutions. 
Successful commanders who adopted courses of action based on their armies’ capabilities 
and limitations compensated for material disadvantages with hybrid combinations of 
regular and partisan forces. Modern insurgencies seem unique, but guerilla warfare by 
regional inhabitants against the flanks and rear areas of occupation armies predominates 
world military history. Major Generals Charles Cornwallis and Phillip Sheridan’s guerilla 
woes confirmed the integral nature of unconventional warfare to the US. The historian 
John Ellis points out that “guerilla warfare is usually the struggle of a weak people 
against superior numbers and technology…[and] has to mesh with the most basic 
aspirations of the people and…paying attention to the social, economic, and political 
configurations of a particular society.” Patriot Brigadier General Francis Marion and 
Confederate Colonel John Singleton Mosby were optimally efficient partisans whose 
gravitas allowed them to offset material disadvantages by leveraging available resources 
asymmetrically. They immobilized stronger armies with ancient guerilla principles and 
mounted tactics tailored to their political and geographical terrain, manpower, 
technology, and strategic goals.11 Despite Mosby’s talent, guerilla warfare’s stigma 
                                                 
11 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 
1860-1941 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 23; In Invisible Armies: An 
Epic History of Guerilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present (New York: 
Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), Max Boot describes the American Revolution 
as an example of “hybrid warfare” because the Patriots used a “one-two punch…with the 
irregulars weakening the army of occupation until a conventional force could administer 
a coup de grace, 78;” Lord Charles Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, May 26, 1781, and 
June 30, 1781, The Cornwallis Papers: The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in The 
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influenced conservative Confederate officials to limit the scope of his operations 
compared to Marion’s more essential revolutionary role. Marion and Mosby were 
nevertheless alike as underdogs who became the partisan masters of their times.  
The Southern People’s War 
The American Revolution was radical by eighteenth-century standards. The 
historian Gordon Wood argues that the Revolution was “a momentous upheaval 
that…altered the character of American society [and] decisively affected the course of 
subsequent history.” The movement obliterated the social stratification of the European 
“great chain of being” to create the most democratically minded people in the world. The 
upheaval meant different things to different people, however. Massachusetts citizens 
were more opposed to arbitrary revenue acts than Virginians, who were alarmed by their 
increasing indebtedness to British merchants after the Proclamation line of 1763 halted 
their land speculation and arbitrarily enforced Navigation Acts cut into their profits. 
Southerners like Thomas Jefferson sided with Massachusetts radicals to counter 
economic and political domination from British authorities who allied with merchants, 
slaves, and Indians to undermine planter autonomy. The 1774 Nonimportation Act’s 
unintended consequences enabled slaves and farmers to threaten gentry authority, which 
galvanized men like George Washington to fight for independence to protect the social 
                                                 
Southern Theatre of the American Revolutionary War, vol. 5, Ian Saberton, ed. (Uckfield: 
The Naval and Military Press, 2010), 86, 105; John Ellis, A Short History of Guerilla 
Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 7, 48-53, 84-91; Carl Von Clausewitz, On 
War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 479-483.   
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order. The historian Sylvia Frey argues that the southern war was a literal revolution for 
slaves, who exploited wartime chaos to gain their freedom. She argues that the southern 
war “became a war about slavery, if not a war over slavery.” Notwithstanding, South 
Carolina elites like Henry Laurens and Christopher Gadsden were certainly radical in the 
context of an eighteenth-century world in which free societies were the exception to the 
rule. They exemplified the colony-wide “well-bred, well-wed, well-fed, and well-read” 
elites who were opposed to British economic and political dominance. Laurens was 
radicalized by the Admiralty Courts’ attempts to make him dependent by seizing his 
ships in 1765. Carolina gentry like Laurens threw their support behind the Patriot 
government during the 1776 independence movement to escape arbitrary British 
domination.12   
Great Britain’s southern invasion ignited a true “people’s war.” The Patriot David 
Ramsay described the significance of South Carolina’s militia which had existed since 
1670: 
All forms of government, hitherto of force in Carolina, agreed in this 
particular: that every subject or citizen should also be a soldier…The laws 
required every free man of suitable age, with a few necessary exemptions, 
to be enrolled as a member of some militia company and to be equipped 
and trained for public service…The people could not brook a standing 
army in time of peace, but were required to be always ready to defend 
themselves.13   
 
                                                 
12 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993), 4-7; Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the 
Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999), vii, 62-63, 91; Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance 
in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 4, 84-95, 124-130, 
140-142, 169-172, 324. 
13 David Ramsay, History of South Carolina, from Its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 
1808, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Newberry: WJ Duffie, 1858), 70-71. 
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Many southerners had been reluctant revolutionaries until the Battles of Lexington and 
Concord (April 19, 1775) and Breed’s Hill (June 18, 1775) spurred South Carolina’s 
Provincial Congress to raise three militia regiments and adopt a constitution on March 26, 
1776. Royal governors theoretically controlled militia, but the tradition of colonists who 
elected their own officers allowed the Whigs to mobilize the militias as instruments of 
revolution. South Carolina’s Committee of Safety directed the newly appointed militia 
commanders to crack down on internal resistance to the Patriot cause. The Whig 
government suppressed Tories in 1776, but only managed to maintain subsequent civil 
control by ignoring neutral civilians.14 Most South Carolinians lacked the depth of 
conviction to take sides until the British invasion in June 1780 forced the issue. British 
General Henry Clinton’s southern plan was to “Americanize” the war by using Redcoats 
to empower subdued Loyalists to re-establish civil governance friendly to the crown. By 
forcing inhabitants to either join him or fight, however, his no-neutrality policy failed to 
re-establish security by effectively pitting pre-existing Whig and Tory citizen militias 
against each other.15 The outcome of the militias’ civil war shaped the course of the 
southern conflict.     
                                                 
14 John Rutledge, “A Proclamation,” The South Carolina and American General Gazette, 
March 27, 1776, 41, microfilm; William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, 
So Far as It Related to the States of North and South Carolina, and Georgia, vol. 1, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 75-107; John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The 
British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782. 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of 
Alabama Press, 2003), 24-25, 50. 
15 Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion; Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His 
Campaigns, 1775-1782 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 85-89, 110, 159-161; 
Pancake, Destructive War, 24-25, 50-51, 78-81; Charles Stedman, The History of the 
Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War. By C. Stedman, who Served 
Under Sir W. Hows, Sir H. Clinton and the Marquis Cornwallis In Two Volumes, vol. 2, 
2nd ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 198-199. 
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British Major General Charles Cornwallis and Patriot Major General Nathanael 
Greene’s strategies were both militia-reliant. The Patriot victory at Saratoga in 1777 had 
expanded Britain’s limited North American war into a vast global conflict against France, 
Spain, and Holland. The American Secretary, Lord George Germain, was faced with a 
stalemate in the mid-Atlantic states between 1777 and 1779, as well as the necessity for 
home defense and Caribbean operations. He therefore shifted from a northern conquest 
strategy to a southern invasion plan reliant upon enabling provincial militia to re-assert 
themselves.  Redcoats would back Loyalists who would reestablish the Empire in 
America by restoring the civil government and security.16 After Cornwallis, Clinton’s 
subordinate, failed to accomplish his civil-military goals by, with, and through the militia, 
he effectively shifted to almost purely conventional operations. Greene conversely set the 
conditions for Patriot victory by “never los[ing] sight of the fact that he was fighting a 
political war.”17 Despite Britain’s decreased manpower after Saratoga, Greene was 
cognizant of his inferiority in numbers, training, and equipment. He explained the 
necessity of mobilizing the militia to General George Washington:  
How to imploy our little force if we are attacked both in Virginia and N. 
Carolina at the same time is difficult to determine…This force with the 
occasional aid of the militia will serve to confine the enemy in their limits 
and render it difficult for them to subsist in the interior country…I see but 
little prospect of getting a force to contend with the enemy upon equal 
grounds and therefore must make the most of a kind of partisan war until 
we can levy and equip a larger force.18  
 
                                                 
16 Clinton, American Rebellion, 85-89, 110, 159-161; Pancake, Destructive War, 24-25. 
17 Pancake, Destructive War, xiii, 244. 
18 Major General Nathanael Greene to General George Washington, October 31, 1780, 
The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, vol. 6, Richard K. Showman and others, eds.  
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 447-449.  
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The South, however, was different from the world that Greene had known. Southern 
operations would be complicated by the climate, geography, and society. 
An eighteenth-century southern campaign required local knowledge. Slave-based 
rice plantation agriculture made South Carolina the wealthiest colony and created a class 
divide between the politically powerful Low Country planter elite and Scotch-Irish and 
German Piedmont inhabitants. The Low Country coastal wetland region was laced with 
major and estuarial river systems, swamps, sea islands, and marshes, and extended from 
Georgia’s St. Lawrence River, north to North Carolina’s Cape Fear River, and sixty miles 
inland (See Figure 2a). The elites’ power was built on staple crop production and a slave 
labor force that comprised sixty-one percent of the population. Frey breaks down the 
demographics:  
In 1775 South Carolina’s white population was an estimated 70,000, the 
slave population approximately 100,000. Of these, 14,302 whites and 
72,743 blacks clustered in the three Low Country districts of Beaufort, 
Charleston, and Georgetown; 55, 689 whites and 27,253 blacks lived in 
the backcountry districts of Camden, Cheraw, Ninety Six, and 
Georgetown.19   
 
The Scottish surveyor James Whitelaw observed that southern coastal rivers made travel 
difficult, and that “the good land lies mostly in narrow strips along the water sides.” The 
Savannah, Salkehatchie, Edisto, Wateree, and Pee Dee Rivers were major commercial, 
communication, and military arteries. Along those rivers were the large-scale plantations 
of planter-elites like John Rutledge and William Drayton, who sent commodities by boat 
to Charleston for export. Charleston factors like Laurens and Gadsden exported rice, 
indigo, and lumber; and imported slaves and manufactured goods which they sold at their 
                                                 
19 Frey, Water from the Rock, 10. 
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stores located near ferries within the river complex. The Charleston elite monopolized 
politics and society.20 Such were the socioeconomic and physical obstacles for a 
republican-based military uprising.  
 Greene’s success hinged on the assistance of knowledgeable local leaders. 
Control of river planter communities was strategically vital. When Cornwallis invaded 
with 4,000 Redcoats in June 1780, he attempted to pacify the interior by establishing a 
chain of river-supported combat outposts. Georgetown was accessible by sea; Cheraw 
Hill was connected to Georgetown by the Pee Dee River; Camden, which became his 
principle outpost and supply node, was located on the Wateree, tributary to the Santee. 
Rocky Mount was located further along the Wateree; Ninety Six was close to the Saluda; 
and Augusta was located on the Savannah. Essential supplies like ammunition, 
gunpowder, salt, rum, and clothing were shipped from Charleston up the Ashley River to 
Friday’s Ferry, transshipped by land to the Santee, and then sent by flatboat to Camden. 
Cornwallis relied on Royal Militia and slaves to procure crops and livestock from the 
countryside, but counterinsurgency and offensive operations required the functionality of 
his supply “magazines” and “chain of communications.” He established a line of posts at 
Biggen’s, Nelson’s, and Scott’s Lake to provide a military presence and facilitate the 
supply flow from Charleston to Camden.21 The interior outposts’ vitality depended upon 
the healthy social climate and goodwill of nearby planter communities. 
                                                 
20 James Whitelaw, The Journal of James Whitelaw, 1773-1793, Vermont Historical 
Society, https://canvas.jmu.edu/courses, 32-34; George Rogers, Jr., Charleston in the Age 
of the Pinckneys, 2nd ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1980), 5-8, 12-
24; Colonel William R. Davie to the Maryland Line, November 11, 1780, The William 
Richardson Davie Papers, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill. 
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Marion owned Northeastern South Carolina because he knew local conditions. 
The vitality of Greene’s combat power depended on Marion’s cooperation, who he tasked 
to “harass the enemies’ communications, and provid[e] intelligence in cooperation with 
the [new] strategic planning of the Southern Department.” Greene and his Continentals 
provided the strategic vision and direction for the southern war waged primarily by 
irregulars. He offered leadership and a core of professionals around which the irregulars 
steadily coalesced as circumstances improved. His operational momentum required the 
buy-in of Brigadier Generals Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter to mobilize 
the resistance necessary for victory.22 In contrast to Major General Horatio Gates, who 
effectively ignored partisans, Greene tactfully recruited Marion: 
I have not the honor of your acquaintance but am no stranger to 
your…merit. Your services…in aiding the forces and preventing the 
enemy from extending their limits have been very important and it is my 
earnest desire that you continue…Until a more permanent army can be 
collected in the field at present we must endeavor to keep up a Partizan 
War and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people as much as 
possible in our favor.23  
Cornwallis conversely sought decisive battles with what he believed was the Patriot 
center of gravity, Greene’s Continental core. Like a hydra, Greene broke up his army to 
garner strength from the countryside. He remained east of the Pee Dee River, sent 
Brigadier General Daniel Morgan’s 120 miles west of the Catawba River to assist 
partisans in western South Carolina, and eventually detached Colonel Lighthorse Harry 
Lee’s mounted “Legion” to assist Marion. The strategy emboldened partisans who 
augmented Greene and undermined Cornwallis’ offensive by suppressing Loyalists. 
                                                 
22 Greene to Washington, October 31, 1780, Greene Papers, vol. 6, 447-449; Pancake, 
Destructive War, 54, 244.   
23 Greene to Colonel Francis Marion, December 4, 1780, Greene Papers, vol. 6, 519-520. 
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Greene stoked the southern people’s war to such a conflagration that 2,200 militia and 
400 riflemen enthusiastically joined his 1,600 Continentals at Guilford Courthouse, 
giving him more than two-to-one numerical superiority over Cornwallis’ 1,900 
Redcoats.24 The Southern Campaign was a truly hybrid people’s war fueled by an armed 
citizenry.       
A Civil War by “Professionals” 
The Confederate government created a professional army to fight conventionally. 
One reason was Richmond’s comparatively elitist political and military establishment. 
Unlike the Patriots, Confederates seceded expressly to preserve slavery and protect the 
social order.25 Southern war-induced internal socioeconomic upheaval was ultimately 
suppressed by an oligarchy that established and retained political control after secession. 
President Jefferson Davis strove to insulate slave-based society from external and internal 
turmoil by maintaining a unified, harmonious, paternalistic, deferential social order. 
Confederate Nationalism built on republican pro-slavery ideals anti-democratically 
empowered elites like Davis to control the political discourse, protect planter interests, 
and shield society from democratic excesses. Richmond’s top-down consensus 
effectively scotched the interpretation, resolution, and control of revolutionary “frictions” 
                                                 
24 Cornwallis to Clinton, June 30, 1780, Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-
Sackville, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), 169-171; Major Patrick Ferguson 
to Cornwallis, August 29, and 22-23 September 1780, Cornwallis Papers, vol. 2, 44-46, 
146-147; Cornwallis to Lord Nisbet Balfour, November 22, 1780, Cornwallis to John 
Harris Cruger, November 11, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, vol. 3, 86-87, 268-269; Joseph B. 
Mitchell, Decisive Battles of the American Revolution (Yardley: Westholme Publishing, 
1962), 180-182. 
25 South Carolina Convention (1860-1862), Declaration of the Immediate Causes which 
Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union: and the 
Ordinance of Secession (Charleston: Evans and Cogswell, 1860), 6-8, 
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garnered by Confederate nationalism and independence.26 Furthermore, Davis’ 
suppression of political parties and dissent produced toxic factionalism that strengthened 
his hand by allowing him to centralize military authority and create a “levee en masse” 
with the first Conscription Act (April 16, 1862). In contrast to the nucleic militia-
augmented Continental Army, the Confederate army was composed of all southern white 
men between eighteen and thirty-five, conscripted for three year enlistments. 
Revolutionary style irregulars who once joined and left the army at will became the 
minority as the war department technically embraced military theorist Baron De Jomini’s 
concept of a permanent, professional army of Napoleonic-style heavy battalions and 
“grand tactics.”27 Richmond’s ruling class redefined warfare.               
Confederate and Union Armies conventionalized similarly. President Abraham 
Lincoln used a combination of martial law and slave emancipation (September 22, 1862) 
in states under rebellion to firmly secure Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri 
for the Union. Unlike the eighteenth-century American Secretary George Germain, 
Lincoln became free to devote the North’s full resources to crush the rebellion without 
international interference. He first appealed to southern unionists, but four-to-one 
numerical superiority, control of the seas, and proximity to the rebellious states meant 
that Federal generals, unlike Cornwallis, were never required to back local militia in 
                                                 
26 Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in 
the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 26-36, 84-
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27 George C. Rable, The Confederate Republic: A Revolution Against Politics (Chapel 
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Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Captain GH Mendell, reprint. (Radford: Wilder 
Publications, 2008), 23-24, 136-158. 
24 
 
 
 
southern-occupied territory to accomplish war aims.28 Northern and southern state 
militias that supported initial manpower requirements were incorporated into regular 
armies by 1863. In the North, about 2,100,000 men, or half of the military aged 
population served; in the South three-fourths, or 850,000 men served—roughly 10,000 or 
less of them were ever partisans. By comparison, 56,000 British forces served in North 
America throughout the American Revolution; an estimated 100,000 Patriots served at 
some point or another, many were temporary militia. General Robert E. Lee’s largest 
mobile army totaled 77,000; General Washington’s army never exceeded 19,000. The 
Patriot Southern Campaign and Confederate Shenandoah Valley operations were 
ancillary to the main theaters. Variance between Patriot and Confederate unconventional 
reliance is clarified through quantitative comparisons of Marion and Mosby’s irregular 
commands with their respective regular forces. Marion’s fluid 700-to-1,000-man force 
was between fifteen-and-twenty-three percent the size of Greene’s fully augmented army 
at Guilford Courthouse. In contrast, Mosby’s 700-to-800-man 43rd Ranger Battalion was 
only three-to-four percent of the size of Early’s purely conventional 21,000-man army at 
Cedar Creek.29 Confederate conscription measures and the smaller role of partisans 
corroborates arguments that the elite slave-centric Confederate mindset precluded a real 
“people’s war.”             
                                                 
28 J.B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary, vol. 1 (United States: Old Hickory Bookshop, 
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Mosby was a talented innovator enabled by his mentor, Major General James 
Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart. Unlike Marion, who began guerilla operations as a Lieutenant 
Colonel, Mosby began as Stuart’s scout. He later reflected “that Stuart was the only 
[officer]…who expected that [he] would accomplish anything.” After his superior 
performance convinced Stuart to allow him to operate behind enemy lines in late 1862, 
his raids escalated from tactical pinpricks to major Union embarrassments. Whereas 
Marion had taken charge of a spontaneous resistance movement against occupiers, 
Mosby was granted an independent command for pioneering sustained irregular warfare 
behind a well-defined salient of enemy picket lines.30 Just as Greene leaned on Marion, 
Stuart and Lee increasingly utilized partisans like Mosby and Captain Hanse McNeill. As 
attrition subtracted leadership, however, less gifted leaders like Major General Jubal 
Early never embraced the concept of clandestine small unit operations. The predominant 
strategic obsession with largescale linear battles was reflected by General John B. Hood’s 
adjutant: 
The crisis is upon us…I hold it to be the paramount duty of every patriot 
in the land to put his shoulder to the wheel, and make one grand 
unanimous effort to defeat the enemy and drive him back at every 
point…31 
 
                                                 
30 Pension Record of John James (S18051), trans. William Graves, www.revwarapps.org; 
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Confederate creativity diminished as Grant’s 1864 coordinated offensive shrank Lee’s 
manpower and resources, freedom of maneuver, and leadership pool. Guerilla warfare 
had almost amounted to a lost art until a few independent-minded officers demonstrated 
that avoiding enemy strong points and attacking weak points behind enemy lines was 
feasible. While Generals Nathan B. Forrest and John H. Morgan conducted the largest 
partisan raids in the Mississippi River Valley, Virginia produced its own unique variant.32 
Virginia was the most powerful southern state. Colonial Virginia had resembled 
South Carolina, but slave-based antebellum transportation and industrial advancements 
facilitated the Old Dominion’s unparalleled state-wide economic diversification and 
growth. The historian Aaron Sheehan-Dean argues that slavery’s widespread application 
socioeconomically fused formerly disparate regions: 
Farmers used slaves in all types of agricultural production in the state, 
from the tobacco plantations of the central and southern Piedmont to the 
wheat and cornfields of the Valley. Slaveowners also used their slaves in a 
growing number of industrial pursuits, from the Kanawha salt works to the 
Shenandoah ironworks to the forges of Richmond.33     
Unlike divided revolutionary South Carolina, and excepting West Virginia, slavery’s 
profitability coupled with internal improvements to mitigate previous “intra-state” 
divisions and facilitate a fundamental “unity of purpose” among Confederate Virginians. 
Comprehensive antebellum transportation developments established the connectivity of 
once separate regions into an integrated society with shared political, social, and 
                                                 
32 Jomini, Art of War, 23-24; Mosby, Memoirs, 124-138, 193-196; Mosby, 
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economic interests.34 Large rivers like the Potomac and Rappahannock remained vital 
commercial and military arteries and served as successive natural defensive barriers 
against Union invasion. By 1861, Virginia’s internal improvements included expanded 
sea ports, canals, turnpikes, large urban factories, and more combined railroad mileage 
than all states except for New York and Pennsylvania. The Confederate government 
made Richmond the capital and Virginia the main theater and line of defense to protect 
southern infrastructure, manufacturing, and the slave base-of-support that supported the 
conventional war.35 In 1863 Mosby’s asymmetric raids behind enemy lines became a 
practical solution for problems which conventional tactics were ill-suited.       
 As Union forces repeatedly menaced Richmond, the irregular war predominated 
west of Washington D.C., Virginia’s northern Piedmont, throughout the Shenandoah and 
Bull Run Valleys, and throughout West Virginia’s northern Allegheny Mountains. 
Mosby’s Confederacy (See Figure 2b) consisted of Loudon, Fauquier, Fairfax, and Prince 
William Counties. The limitless tactical cover and concealment within the forested Bull 
Run and Blue Ridge Mountains, valleys, plantations, and farms made Rangers virtually 
impossible to apprehend or eradicate.36 The Piedmont was Virginia’s wealthiest region 
with the largest slave percentages; many counties consisted of fifty percent or more 
slaves. Loudoun and Fauquier County residents owned the most slaves in the state, stood 
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to lose the most in the war, produced the highest enlistment rates, and were usually 
behind enemy lines.37 The area was traversed by strategically important railroads, along 
which spanned telegraph lines that provided instantaneous communication. The 
Baltimore and Ohio (B & O) Railroad was Washington’s key communication and 
sustainment line to the Old Northwest, and extended through Harper’s Ferry, a hotly 
contested region just north of Mosby’s Confederacy. The hub of the vital Manassas Gap 
(MGR) and Orange and Alexandria (O & A) Railroads was Manassas, in the heart of 
Mosby’s Confederacy. The Union and Confederate armies both used railroads, 
telegraphs, and turnpikes like the Berryville and Valley Roads to coordinate their 
operations and mass troops. While Grant depended on the O & A to supply his army 
during his 1864 Overland Campaign, Sheridan attempted to refurbish the MGR, which 
traversed Mosby’s territory, to clear the Shenandoah Valley.38 Mosby wrought havoc on 
Union operations by menacing and attacking Northern Virginia’s key military 
infrastructure aggressively, frequently, and at will.  
Stuart and Lee integrated Mosby. The Confederate Partisan Ranger Act on April 
21, 1862 was an admission that regular forces alone were insufficient for handling larger 
and encroaching Union armies. Richmond awarded Mosby command of the Ranger 
Battalion in January 1863 because he demonstrated an uncanny ability to frustrate Union 
operations by disrupting sustainment.39  Mosby described his tangential role:  
I conducted war on the theory that the end of it is to secure peace by the 
destruction of the resources of the enemy, with as small a loss as possible 
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to my own side…I was directly under the orders of Stuart up to the time of 
his death, in May, 1864, and after that time, of Gen. Robert E. Lee, until 
the end of the war…In a letter received from Stuart about this, he said, ‘I 
heartily wish you great and increasing success in the glorious career on 
which you have entered.’40 
 
He functioned like Marion—scouted and performed reconnaissance for Stuart, attacked 
supply lines in the form of railroads and wagon trains, and ambushed isolated enemy 
detachments, pickets, and couriers. He also cooperated with leaders like Major General 
John Breckinridge and Early when they campaigned in the Shenandoah Valley. His 
Rangers reached peak strength and efficiency when Major General Phillip Sheridan’s 
Army of the Shenandoah faced Early’s outnumbered Army of the Valley. Unlike Greene, 
who sent Marion written communication, Early never sent Mosby any written directives 
or attempted serious coordination.41 His unwillingness to utilize Mosby reflected his 
incompetence and antebellum elitism.  
 
The Bygone Era 
Conventional military wisdom and attitudes had changed considerably. Historian 
Wayne Lee asserts that Whig revolutionaries and leaders who turned to the militia to 
build the Continental Army had originally valued moral virtue as the key military 
attribute and perceived standing armies as a threat to their personal liberties. Whig 
ideology rooted in the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the Glorious Revolution 
(1688) articulated the necessity of maintaining vigilance to safeguard liberty from two 
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threats—an immoral population that invites tyrannical rule; or a monarch who dominates 
a representative legislative body. Patriots who were denied Parliamentary representation, 
taxed without consent, and forced into compliance by the British Admiralty Courts and 
military, cited Enlightenment documents like John Locke’s “Second Treatise” to justify 
their “appeal to heaven” and armed resistance against British tyranny. They compromised 
their values to allow for the creation of a disciplined army to oppose the British, and 
swallowed bitter apprehensions of standing armies as corrupt instruments of tyranny.42 
Washington based his army on the European model. Most Continentals carried 
standard smoothbore muskets equipped with bayonets with effective ranges of about 
seventy-five meters. Continental armies faced British and Hessian forces in fields in 
which both sides massed combat power by organizing into tightly formed units that fired 
volleys at thirty paces before delivering bayonet charges. Revolutionary cavalrymen 
generally carried a saber, and either a shortened musket or a blunderbuss (muzzle-loaded 
shotgun). In Europe and the mid-Atlantic states, cavalry theoretically performed 
reconnaissance by ascertaining enemy size, composition, location, activity, and intent; 
counter-reconnaissance, by preventing the enemy from performing reconnaissance; shock 
tactics, by surprising and striking a confused enemy, or an enemy’s flanks or rear without 
allowing them reaction time; and pursuit, attacking retreating forces to destroy or prevent 
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their reorganization.43 The historian Charles Royster chronicles the Patriots’ 
revolutionary zeal, and argues that despite the Continentals’ initial poor discipline, mass 
desertions, and crisis of confidence following 1776 military reversals, Patriots ultimately 
performed commensurate with their ideals.44 Yet, professionalization was never 
universal.  
The southern militia was shaped by unique conditions and attributes. Brigadier 
Generals Marion, Pickens, and Sumter’s men were self-reliant, skilled horsemen 
tempered by the Regulator Movement, five years of sporadic guerilla war, and numerous 
campaigns against the Cherokee.45 European-style shock cavalry tactics were ineffective 
in America’s less-developed and populated landscape. Southerners, however, were 
almost always mounted to negotiate their more wretched roads and restrictive terrain. 
“Light-horse” Henry Lee explained the importance of horsemanship to southern society: 
No country in the world affords better riders…especially the States south 
of Pennsylvania. The boys from seven years of age begin to mount…[and] 
become so completely versed…as to equal the most expert horseman 
anywhere.46    
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Southerners mainly abandoned European tactics in favor of their own frontier-style of 
fighting after the Battle of Camden on August 18, 1780. They sometimes fought from 
horseback, but usually rode to battle and fought dismounted. They used whatever 
weapons were available, including “firelock” rifles, Brown Bess and Queen Anne 
muskets, pistols, hatchets, crude swords, and occasionally sabers. The historian Jac 
Weller calls Marion “the great master of partisan surprise.” His men would typically ride 
up to sixty miles through the swamps to infiltrate, surround, surprise, and inflict 
maximum casualties at close quarters on enemies at night or at dawn. Marion’s one rifle-
equipped company would typically remain beyond the grasp of enemy units and deliver 
deadly harassing fire; another tactic was to bait enemy units with small cavalry 
detachments into numerous successive ambushes.47 With the help of partisans, Greene 
officially adopted the same tactics by instructing Morgan to avoid pitched battles in favor 
of raids wherein “success would not greatly depend upon the numbers but on the secrecy 
and spirit of the attack.”48 Greene’s practical mindset became a foreign concept to 
subsequent Confederate elites.  
 
Suppression of a National War 
The Confederate oligarchy defined political and military protocol. Only one third 
of southerners owned slaves by 1861, and many valued the traditional concept of a 
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citizen militia. Some Confederates, like Mosby, agreed with Lincoln that the issue of 
slavery had caused the war; others were compelled by honor, resented invasion, or 
believed that the Constitution was a compact between sovereign states. Numerous 
citizens and politicians like Kentucky Senator Henry C. Burnett favored a revolutionary 
style people’s war, or what Jomini termed a “national war.” The Richmond Enquirer even 
stated that “A People in Arms’ cannot be conquered.”49 Nevertheless, Davis’ West Point 
clique dominated the military, disliked guerillas, and comprised 36.7 percent of the 
Officer Corps. The historian William Skelton argues that the West Point establishment 
“shaped in myriad ways the conduct of the war: strategy, tactics, logistics, staff 
operations, and civil military operations.”50 Civil War tactics therefore became 
characterized by close-order regimental formations whereby successive two-deep lines of 
soldiers fired massed volleys, typically with Enfield or Springfield rifled muskets. Their 
weapons’ Minie balls and rifling increased maximum effective ranges to 400 yards. The 
historian Grady McWhiney argues that the doctrine influenced by Jomini and Dennis 
Hart Mahan advocating “tactical offensives,” frontal assaults, and bayonet charges, 
coupled with deadly new weaponry, produced the war’s horrendous casualties.51 The 
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improved accuracy and rates of fire meant that cavalry no longer attacked infantry lines 
head-on. Mounted units like Stuart’s screened for the army, performed reconnaissance 
and counter-reconnaissance, and attempted to neutralize enemy cavalry.52 Nevertheless, 
no organization defied convention and military theory like the individualistic “young 
bloods” of the Confederate Cavalry. 
 The distinction between regular and irregular southern cavalry was blurry. Many 
of Forrest and Morgan’s men, for example, were temporary civilian-clad troopers who 
melted back into the population after raids. Like Stuart’s cavalry, everyone in Mosby’s 
unit was an expert rider with two “indispensable” items, pistols and horses. Their tactical 
proficiency supports historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s assertion that a southern “code of 
honor” required youth “to prove early virility” by willingness to fight, shoot, play sports, 
and “a duty to ride [a horse] with expertise.” General William T. Sherman described them 
colorfully: 
War suits them and the rascals are bold to rashness and dangerous subjects 
in every sense…This is a larger class than most men suppose and they are 
the most dangerous set of men that this war has turned loose upon the 
world. They are splendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless. 
Stewart, John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson are the types and leaders of 
this class.53 
 
Wyatt-Brown believed that southern society was warlike because vigilantism, lynch law, 
dueling, and slave patrols became “expressions of community will,” and white males’ 
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obligation to manage chattel slavery perpetuated southern social institutions.54 The 
Rangers built a ferocious reputation that epitomized Sherman’s observations and Wyatt-
Brown’s theories.  
The historian Jeffry Wert emphasizes that “the Rangers took excellent care of 
their mounts,” and “rode some of the finest horses in the Old Dominion.” Their weapon 
of choice was the six-shot, single action, .44 caliber Army Colt revolver. Rangers 
typically carried two revolvers and occasionally carbines or shotguns. They almost never 
used sabers. As they moved to enemy areas Mosby sent ahead small reconnaissance 
parties to scout objectives, assembled men at nearby rally points, identified concealed 
attack positions and arrayed the men, and then signaled the Rangers to approach the 
engagement areas in columns of four. After final halts in which he identified the target, 
he directed the Rangers forward in “helter-skelter” races in which his men swarmed and 
rode through their enemies in brief, intense, close-quarter engagements with pistols. 
Rangers familiar with the terrain often dominated comparably sized Union cavalry 
detachments, not only by exploiting the element of surprise, but because pistols simply 
outperformed sabers in close-quarter engagements. Mosby occasionally initiated attacks 
by directing his small, mobile artillery battery to fire shots into the surprised enemy. 
After lightning attacks on pickets, troop detachments, couriers, outposts, headquarters, 
trains, and wagon convoys, Rangers quickly dispersed into the surrounding mountains 
and farms. The historian Bruce Catton points out that since Confederate cavalry “could 
have taught circus riders tricks, the Yankees were hopelessly outclassed.”  Mosby took a 
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page from Marion’s playbook by sending small detachments to bait enemy units through 
gauntlets of successive ambushes.55 Surprise cavalry raids were a southern specialty that 
transcended technology. 
Irregular Solutions Across Time 
Marion and Mosby tailored partisan warfare to societal conditions and approached 
“people’s war[s]” economically in response to superior numbers and technology. 
Clausewitz asserts that in a “people’s war,” a weak army can overcome a stronger one by 
directing and cooperating with “militia and bands of armed civilians,” or partisans.  
Partisans, he said, should avoid direct confrontation with superior forces, harass enemy 
outposts and detachments in rear and flank areas with hit-and-run tactics calculated to 
inflict maximum damage with minimal risk, suppress civilian support for the enemy, and 
augment the professional army in conventional battles under favorable circumstances.25 
Both achieved what Jomini and Clausewitz considered the partisans’ primary goals. The 
“feeling of uneasiness and dread” that they created increased “a thousandfold the 
difficulties” of their enemies by creating hostile environments that engulfed invading 
units. Cornwallis described the effects of Marion’s raids in 1781: 
Colonel Marion has so wrought on the minds of the people, partly by the 
terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments and partly by the 
promise of plunder, that there was scarce an inhabitant between the Santee 
and the Pedee that was not in arms against us. Some parties even carried 
terror to the gates of Charleston.56 
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In 1864, a Unionist newspaper reported that “the timid ones” are “afraid [that] Mosby 
will dash across the river…[and] burn Hagerstown,” and that “Mosby has attacked our 
troops at different points between Winchester and Harper’s Ferry…and has gobbled up 
some prisoners.” They accomplished what modern strategists refer to as the three 
principles of irregular warfare: the “logistical principle,” disruption of supply and 
communication lines to slow an enemy invasion; the “corrosion principle,” attenuation of 
enemy morale and civilian war support with raids that discredit, delegitimize, and 
destabilize the enemy occupation; and the “diversion principle,” compelling the enemy to 
weaken his line of battle strength by diverting troops to protect weak points such as 
outposts, detachments, and convoys.57 Despite their policy makers’ different decisions 
about irregular warfare, both were optimally efficient. 
When the revolutionary government vanished as the British captured Charleston, 
the pre-1780 militia system “conferred upon…partisan leaders the authority” to operate. 
Marion’s ragged force of planters and farmers, often refugees, varied in size based on 
military circumstances and crop cycles.27 These “people in arms” rallied to Marion, 
Pickens, and Sumter in response to brazen Redcoats and Tories who often abused them 
and burned them out of their homes. Ramsay explained the essence of Marion’s strength: 
Revenge and despair cooperated with patriotism to make these ruined men 
keep the field. The devouring flames sent on defenseless habitations by 
blind rage and brutal policy, increased not only the zeal but the number of 
his followers. For several months he and his party were obliged to sleep in 
the open air, and to shelter themselves in the thick recesses of the deep 
swamps.58 
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As arbitrary violence swelled the militia surrounding British garrisons like storm clouds, 
partisans remained just beyond the grasp of the superior forces which they corroded by 
striking isolated detachments and supply convoys before melting into the swamps. 
Marion’s other major objectives were the Wateree, Congaree, Santee, and Pee Dee 
Rivers, which critically disrupted interior sustainment and communication. He 
logistically snarled Cornwallis by disrupting river and road supply and communication; 
corroded British strength by creating Loyalist fear and British doubt among civilians and 
politicians who demanded a quick victory; and diverted large numbers of Redcoats who 
were tasked to escort supply convoys and perform counter-guerilla operations. He gained 
dominance of the Low Country by December 1780, which enabled Greene’s Continentals 
to achieve the strategic victories that rendered Cornwallis incapable of further offensive 
operations.59 Mosby put Marion’s principles to work in Virginia. 
 Lincoln’s conciliatory strategy failed partly because occupied areas remained 
hostile. One of Mosby’s officers explained how Northern Virginia provided an 
enthusiastic manpower pool and ample civilian support:  
Robin Hood concealed his men in the solitudes of Sherwood Forrest; 
Marion took refuge in the inaccessible swamps of Carolina…but Mosby in 
an open country finds security and dispersion among a friendly and 
chivalrous people…But in some instances, in order to insure greater 
security, the men have built themselves huts in the mountains.60 
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Rangers validated Jomini’s concept that “[i]n mountainous countries the people are 
always most formidable.” They applied “classic techniques of stealth, surprise, speed, 
and deception…,sought out weak points, [struck] their targets quickly” and disappeared. 
Their operations at times tied down roughly one-third of the Union Army and rendered it 
too weak to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. Lincoln complained that “in no other 
way…does the enemy give us so much trouble, at so little expense to himself.” They also 
accomplished the logistical, disruption, and corrosion principles of irregular warfare.61 
Sheridan’s Valley Campaign was a case in point. Mosby’s sensational kidnapping of 
generals, destruction of wagon convoys, and elimination of the MGR as a supply line 
convinced Sheridan not to use the Valley as an avenue of advance against Charlottesville 
in 1864. Mosby’s attacks were sensationalized by newspapers, which aided his creation 
and full exploitation of fear in the minds of Union soldiers. After the war, Sheridan 
confessed that Mosby was the “most redoubtable” guerilla leader because he “depleted 
[Sheridan’s] line-of-battle strength [by] necessitating…large escorts for…[his] supply-
trains.”62  
 Marion and Mosby discovered the formula for success by using limited resources 
to the greatest effect. Just as Shun Tzu and Genghis Khan applied guerilla tactics to cope 
with bigger armies, Marion and Mosby similarly achieved asymmetric mastery.63 They 
targeted vulnerable units and unsympathetic civilians, but their success relied on a 
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sympathetic populace. Under their enemies’ noses they cooperated with civilians who 
enthusiastically supported them from the swamps and mountains. Slave uprisings never 
significantly affected revolutionary partisans, but Sheridan’s Valley devastation and slave 
emancipation significantly undermined Mosby’s civilian support. Their greatest asset was 
the horse, which expanded their tactical capabilities by allowing freedom of movement. 
Their skills and regional familiarity made them efficient partisans. While Marion enabled 
Greene’s Continentals to defeat Cornwallis and clear the South, Mosby’s Rangers 
retained a hollow tactical initiative as the Confederate strategy disintegrated under the 
Union military. Yet both proved that guerilla principles transcend time.  
   Two underdogs became archetypal partisans. It is difficult to measure the 
success of a counterinsurgency and, likewise, to quantify the strategic impact of guerillas. 
The similar nature and effectiveness of their raids are clear, however. That their 
psychological impact and legends grew out of proportion with their exploits signifies 
success: they penetrated their enemies’ psyches and captured Americans’ imaginations. 
While historians have acknowledged their skill, Mosby’s paradoxical image is tainted by 
the “slave power” defeat, and associated with the garden variety of guerillas that remain a 
touchstone of academic debate. Many historians insist, however, that neither 
revolutionary nor Civil War partisans should be ignored. The common observation that 
armies are reflections of their societies applies to Marion and Mosby. While guerilla 
warfare never produced a Confederate victory, neither did conventional operations. 
Partisan warfare was a phenomenon that devastated the Low Country and Valley alike. 
Revolutionary victory provided hope and glory to survivors of the mayhem, but for 
Valley residents the partisan war stoked the flames of defeat. Outcomes aside, Marion 
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and Mosby were underdogs who used their strengths and limited resources to cope with 
impossible odds and, ironically, neither the British nor the Union armies ever effectively 
coped with them.    
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Figure 2a:64                             The Carolina Low Country 
 
Figure 2b:65                       Mosby’s Confederacy 
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CHAPTER 3 
        Out-Politicked: How Francis Marion’s Ambush of Major Robert McLeroth Helped 
to Shift the Southern Balance of Power and Shape the War  
Francis Marion personified South Carolina’s Low Country military establishment. 
The Low Country is a wetland region of major and estuarial river systems that spans from 
the Georgia Sea Islands to Wilmington, North Carolina, and roughly sixty miles inland 
(See Figure 3a). Marion was born at Goatfield Plantation, and grew up around the Santee, 
Black, and Pee Dee Rivers. He gained tactical experience during the Cherokee War 
(1760-1761) as a young lieutenant when his platoon cleared a Cherokee war party from a 
dangerous pass near Etchoe, North Carolina. His supervisor called him a “hardy soldier, 
and an excellent partisan officer.” When the American Revolution began in 1775, Marion 
was a high-value individual—a seasoned and connected leader in sync with local political 
and geographic terrain. He owned a Santee River plantation by 1773, and represented St. 
John’s Parish in the first Provincial Congress in 1775. He joined South Carolina’s Second 
Continental Regiment as a captain and rose to lieutenant-colonel for his firm combat and 
garrison leadership.66 Marion countered Lord Charles Cornwallis’ invasion and 
occupation of South Carolina in the summer of 1780 by leading his constituents in a year-
long hit-and-run campaign that critically weakened British control. Major General 
Nathanael Greene needed serious help when he took over a shattered Continental Army 
in Charlotte, North Carolina on December 2, 1780. Greene integrated Marion’s command 
into his strategy. He succeeded by fully leveraging Marion’s guerillas against British 
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supply lines and manpower. Marion wrested northeastern South Carolina from 
Cornwallis’ grip as Greene drew him into North Carolina. Marion’s campaign culminated 
on December 12th at Halfway Swamp, when he shifted the regional balance of power by 
crippling Cornwallis’ sustainment and civilian support network sufficiently to facilitate 
Greene’s successful Southern Campaign.    
Nathanael Greene was faced with a raw southern deal when he first reached 
Charlotte. He could do little more than menace Cornwallis’ vastly superior army at 
Winnsboro, South Carolina. British General Henry Clinton’s capture of Charleston (May 
12, 1780) and the entire southern army of 5,600 men had been the most significant 
British victory of the American Revolution. The pro-war Whitehall politicians were 
reinvigorated, and the Patriot war effort received a devastating blow that preceded Major 
General Benedict Arnold’s treason, Ethan Allen’s Vermont separatist movement, and 
Continental Army officer mutinies.67 Cornwallis, Clinton’s second-in-command, had 
invaded the Carolina interior in early June and established combat outposts in Augusta, 
Ninety-Six, Camden, Rocky Mount, Cheraw, and Georgetown (See Figure 3b). The 
outposts formed an arc from Georgetown to Augusta, discouraged resistance, and 
projected British power. Between Charleston and the interior posts were smaller 
subsidiary depots along the major river systems that were occupied by Redcoats, 
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Hessians, and Loyalist militia.68 Cornwallis’ destruction of a second Continental Army 
under Major General Horatio Gates at Camden (August 16, 1780) destroyed the last 
Patriot conventional force in the South. What Greene inherited when he took command of 
Gates’ “army” were approximately 950 Continentals and 1500 militiamen who were 
disorganized, malnourished, and half naked. The military situation had looked much 
more promising after the Patriot victory in Saratoga (1777), as France, Spain, and 
Holland all declared war on Britain, challenged British naval supremacy, and siphoned 
away British North American troops. Despite decreased manpower in 1780, Clinton 
commanded 33,893 North American soldiers; in the South, Cornwallis commanded a 
combined 6,700-man Loyalist and Regular force.69 Greene’s recognition of his meager 
resources and prescient grasp of an asymmetric situation on the ground influenced his 
deliberate choice of an unconventional strategy. 
There was no going back to a Gates-style confrontation with Cornwallis’ world-
class army in a narrow field whereby tightly formed armies exchanged massed musket 
volleys at 100 yards before delivering bayonet charges. Charles Stedman, Cornwallis’ 
commissary general, commented after the war that Greene was “sensible that his present 
force was too weak to attempt any direct operation against…Cornwallis…but 
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might…spirit up the militia, without whose assistance and cooperation he saw that he 
could do nothing effectual.” Greene’s strategy reflected reality. He ironically 
demonstrated a better understanding of Saratoga’s strategic lessons than Gates. In 1777, 
Gates’ New England subordinates had executed a Fabian-style fighting withdrawal 
southward up the forested Champlain Valley in which small militia bands obstructed, 
harassed, sniped, and attacked the flanks and rear of British Major General John 
Burgoyne’s superior army. Patriots thus corroded Burgoyne’s army as it penetrated New 
York by cutting his long supply lines and destroying foraging parties through lightning 
attacks acknowledged by modern theorists as guerilla raids. The overwhelming and 
concerted turnout of guerillas under leaders like Brigadier General John Stark helped 
produce a Patriot victory by augmenting Gates’ army and engulfing Burgoyne’s. Greene 
adapted the Saratoga strategic blueprint to the South by incorporating available and well-
established local guerillas—Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens—into a 
genuinely hybrid strategy that combined conventional and guerilla operations. Military 
theorist Max Boot characterizes Marion’s raids as asymmetric because they politically 
delegitimized and weakened the British with minimal insurgent casualties. Marion clearly 
fit Carl Von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung’s model of a partisan as an officially 
sanctioned Continental officer who assisted the regular army by organizing and leading 
local inhabitants in asymmetric raids.70 Greene embraced a hybrid strategy because he 
had to use available resources and a plan that might actually work.    
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Partisans would constrict British operations to facilitate Continental operations. 
As Greene entered South Carolina from Charlotte, he sent written orders to Marion, 
Sumter, and Pickens that articulated a clear plan of cooperation. Marion, however, 
possessed the key to Greene’s success. He was geographically poised to threaten the 
major Santee and Pee Dee River systems that were the vital supply conduits between 
British-occupied Charleston and Georgetown, and Cornwallis’ strategic outposts and 
army in the interior. To that end, Greene deliberately tasked Marion to disrupt British 
supply lines, subdue Loyalists, and provide intelligence. To cope with Cornwallis’ 
superior 4000-man mobile army and his own acute supply challenges, Greene divided his 
army and executed a strategic withdrawal as a means to prolong Britain’s increasingly 
unpopular war and achieve the material parity necessary to fight decisive battles. The 
distance between two smaller Continental armies, Greene in the East, and Brigadier 
General Daniel Morgan in the West, enabled ease of supply from the devastated 
countryside; emboldened state-wide partisan operations; and attenuated Cornwallis by 
baiting him to divide his own army and extend his increasingly vulnerable supply lines 
deep into hostile territory.71 Marion would attack Cornwallis’ sustainment vitals to enable 
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Greene and Brigadier General Daniel Morgan to fight on more equal terms in Cornwallis’ 
front, and eventually win strategic victories at Cowpens (January 17, 1781) and Guilford 
Courthouse (March 15, 1781).72  
Greene’s plan exploited a situation that had ripened prior to his arrival. The 
British southern strategy was collapsing. Clinton’s altruistic intent had been for “loyal 
subjects” to be “assist[ed] in the restoration of civil government and peace” when the 
situation permitted. His strategy, however, lacked clear terms for Loyalist re-
empowerment, which amounted to murky military objectives for the officers tasked to 
pacify the province. Clinton’s combined policies of conquest as a pre-condition for civil 
government and racial manipulation were detrimental to his goal of “Americanizing” the 
war.73 Clinton had issued the Phillipsburg proclamation on June 30, 1779, which 
promised security to all slaves who escaped to the British army, but threatened to auction 
those caught aiding the rebels. South Carolina’s overwhelming fugitive slave turnout in 
response to the initial British invasion convinced Clinton to modify his original policy. 
He tenuously retained the social order and Loyalist allies by directing Charleston’s Board 
of Police to return slaves to Loyalists; Whigs’ escaped slaves served in army support 
roles; and captured slaves were impressed into labor gangs.74 Clinton’s surrender terms at 
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Charleston stipulated that captured Continental soldiers would become prisoners, while 
the 2,500 militia were “permitted to return to their homes on parole” if they remained 
neutral. Clinton then made another crucial policy modification before he relinquished 
departmental command to Cornwallis and sailed to New York.75 He declared his original 
parole terms void, and issued a new proclamation on June 3rd that required previously 
neutral parolees to either take a new oath to actively support “His Majesty’s 
government,” or be treated as enemies. British Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot, Clinton’s co-
peace commissioner at Charleston, observed that “we seem to be so wedded to our 
military power that it will not be parted with until it cannot be avoided.”76 The toxicity of 
Clinton’s policy adjustments became clearer as Cornwallis wholeheartedly attempted to 
enforce them. 
Loyalist re-empowerment catastrophically collapsed. In June 1780, Cornwallis 
organized a “Royal Militia” to serve as a provincial police for the maintenance of “peace 
and good order.”77 He reported his efforts to Clinton: 
As the different districts submitted, I, with all the dispatch in my power, 
formed them into militia, and appointed field officers according to the old 
divisions of the province. I invested these field officers with civil as well 
as military power…This militia, both officers and soldiers, is composed of 
men, either of undoubted attachment in the cause of Great Britain, or 
whose behavior has always been moderate.78 
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Major Patrick Ferguson oversaw the militia by visiting the districts to “procure [muster] 
lists” and to ensure that Cornwallis’ “orders [were] carried into execution.” Cornwallis’ 
delusion that his Camden victory had pacified the province crumbled as sudden partisan 
raids coincided with the alarming deterioration of his militia. He therefore decided that 
only North Carolina’s pacification could protect his South Carolina posts. Numerous 
Royal militiamen deserted in the wake of Camden, and British regulars typically 
perceived those who remained as unreliable pillagers, abusers, and scoundrels. Major 
John Harrison, for example, proposed to Cornwallis to raise a 500-man “provincial 
corps” between the Pee Dee and Wateree Rivers, which he never accomplished. After 
Cornwallis unsuccessfully discouraged desertion with terror tactics, he conceded to 
Ferguson’s observation that Royal Militia were “less warlike than the rebels,” and placed 
heavier reliance upon regular units for essential tasks. His intended plan to empower 
Loyalists effectively resulted in the relegation of the “King’s friends” to garrison duty, 
British unit augmentation, and minor government positions.79 Notwithstanding, shoddy 
civilian support partly reflected the adage that “loyalty is a two-way street.”   
Cornwallis’ idea of the “King’s Peace” effectively pushed inhabitants to their 
limits. Had Clinton never actually intended to brook neutrality, paroled Whig militiamen 
like Pickens and Peter Horry, who had marched to Charleston to accept surrender terms 
before returning home, fully expected to remain neutral in accordance with his original 
terms. The policy shifts unleashed the fury of Cornwallis’ army on thousands of civilians 
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in early June. The Philipsburg proclamation also alienated a significant portion of the 
population who feared loss of “life and fortunes” in a slave uprising. Slave-based rice 
plantation agriculture amounted to a stratified social hierarchy in which slaves 
represented sixty-one percent of the state population and a potentially fatal revolutionary 
flaw. Cornwallis’ racial manipulation negated his efforts to pit the hardscrabble 
“Upcountry” Scotch-Irish and German settlers against the Low Country planter elite by 
unexpectedly galvanizing the entire white population against a perceived British attempt 
to incite servile insurrection. Cornwallis awakened sleeping giants like Marion and 
Pickens by forcing them to either fight former comrades, flee the province, or face 
destruction of life and property. Sadistic British-backed Loyalist reprisals on Whigs and 
neutrals alike characterized a failure to re-establish civil governance, which boiled into a 
civil war in June 1780.80 Redcoats’ reliance on military solutions to delicate political 
problems eroded the civilian support central to Cornwallis’ strategy. As the military 
theorist David Galula explains:  
Military action remains the principal instrument of a conventional 
war…, [but] the picture is different in the revolutionary war. The 
objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it 
over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the 
counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature.81 
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By marginalizing the militia, alienating the population, and focusing on battlefield 
victories, Cornwallis forsook his key objective: the population. His invasion destabilized 
South Carolina by forcing desperate civilians to organize and resist. He thus failed to 
fight a political war, which gave rise to politically savvy partisans like Marion. 
Marion emerged in response to the popular demand of civilians who rallied to 
established Whig political and military leaders to resist persecution. “Lighthorse Harry” 
Lee, who cooperated with Marion, described him in his Memoirs: 
[He] was in stature the smallest size…,enter[ed] into conversation only 
when necessary..., [and] possessed a strong mind…He was sedulous and 
constant in his attention to the duties of his station, to which every other 
consideration yielded…The procurement of subsistence for his men, and 
the contrivance of annoyance to his enemy…Beloved by his friends and 
respected by his enemies, he exhibited a luminous example of the 
beneficial effects to be produced by an individual, who, with only small 
means at his command, possesses a virtuous heart, a strong head, and a 
mind devoted to the common good.82 
Marion’s solid military and political ties made him “an integral part…of his community.” 
Other primary accounts of Marion corroborate Parson Weems’ lofty claim that “Marion 
wished his officers to be gentlemen…[and] the officers of the regiment grew fond of 
him.”83 He had escaped capture at Charleston when he fractured his ankle and was 
ordered to convalesce in the backcountry (April 12). He briefly joined Gates’ Continental 
Army in North Carolina when Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, Cornwallis’ cavalry 
commander, conducted a scorched-earth campaign through his home Williamsburg 
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district. He returned with sixteen men at the request of the militia, who abstained from 
loyalty oaths in response to Tarleton and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Rawdon’s Black 
River-area devastation, plantation and Calvinist church burnings, slave kidnappings, and 
reputed no-quarter policy. Marion was with Gates’ command when he was summoned by 
Major John James, who represented the militia, to return to South Carolina. By avoiding 
the Camden debacle, Marion could resist on his own terms. Like other partisans, he 
abandoned conventional warfare in favor of Cherokee-style night or dawn raids, 
ambushes, and harassing tactics.84 Williamsburg’s residents willingly entrusted Marion 
with their lives because they knew he was unwilling to squander them. 
Marion’s partisans attacked the foundation of British control by disrupting supply 
lines, silencing Tories, attacking patrols, and provoking overreactions. The dense swamps 
aided Marion and hampered the British. Marion leveraged surprise attacks, captured and 
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homemade weapons and swords, and temporary militiamen with expert equestrian and 
boatmanship skills, to offset material inferiority. His partisans fully exploited the rivers, 
creeks, trails, and natural cover to move constantly, control river and road 
communication, avoid unnecessary risks, and strike under favorable circumstances. They 
dressed like Royal Militia, easily infiltrated enemy-occupied areas, and struck like 
thunder in night raids that shocked and destroyed isolated units before they melted back 
into the swamps. The cumulative effect of Marion’s victories between the Pee Dee and 
Cooper Rivers increased his organizational strength and weakened local British 
influence. His cost-efficient raids at Nelson’s Ferry (August 20), Kingstree (August 27), 
Blue Savannah (September 4), and Georgetown (October 8) bolstered his political 
influence at the expense of the British opponents, whom he embarrassed and discredited. 
He provoked the overreaction of Cornwallis, who sent a punitive expedition under Major 
James Wemyss to destroy his guerilla support network. Wemyss burned the Indiantown 
Presbyterian Church, plundered and burned “50 houses and plantations,” hung suspected 
traitors, slaughtered livestock, seized slaves, and completely alienated the population. 
Wemyss’ subsequent prediction that regulars would be required to reestablish local 
control over the enraged inhabitants proved correct.85 Marion’s provocation of British 
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violence increased revolutionary recruitment by stoking anti-British sentiment. He 
accumulated political and military capital at the expense of the British, who he attenuated 
through Low Country-style asymmetric warfare. 
Marion’s men rivaled British regional control by October 1780. His victories 
reinvigorated Whigs who provided the necessary support for his partisans to fight on 
more equal terms. He was promoted to colonel by Governor John Rutledge in recognition 
of his Black Mingo Creek (September 28) victory, and tasked to enforce martial law and 
continue suppression of Loyalists. He established a remote supply base at Snow’s Island 
and his 200-to-300-man force dominated the territory surrounding the British outposts. 
His influence coincided with massive state-wide militia attacks that enveloped 
Cornwallis’ strategic flanks.86 The partisan war reached a crescendo atop King’s 
Mountain, South Carolina on October 7, 1780, when Ferguson’s 1,100 Loyalists were 
utterly destroyed by a mounted partisan army of backcountry and “over-mountain” 
militiamen. This stunning defeat cost Cornwallis one-quarter of his army and prevented 
his immediate invasion of North Carolina. The British forces retreated to Winnsboro to 
refit and protect the western outposts exposed by Ferguson’s defeat.87 The destruction of 
Marion’s force became Cornwallis’ “first priority” as its presence disrupted the vital 
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Santee River supply line to Camden that the British “totally depend[ed]” upon. 
Charleston’s garrison commander was “astonished” at the extent to which Marion 
frustrated British goals by “prevent[ing]” Loyalists from “com[ing] in [to] become 
British subjects.” Cornwallis’ belief that the entirety of the residents between the Santee 
and Pee Dee Rivers were “in arms against” him was confirmed by Marion’s subsequent 
raids on Loyalist units at Tearcoat Swamp (October 26), Allston’s Plantation (November 
8), and Georgetown (November 17). Marion was fundamental to the massive statewide 
resistance that immobilized Cornwallis and sparked doubts about the conflict in military 
circles and among civilians in the British Isles.88 Cornwallis’ military correspondence 
describing his strategic stalemate was circulated and exploited by Whitehall’s peace party 
and printed in The London Gazette.89 Many British civilians who had expected a quick 
victory after Charleston’s capitulation grew increasingly disappointed and disheartened 
by what they perceived as a costly war in a colonial backwater with no apparent end in 
sight. 
The turbulent southern war hung in the balance when Greene took command. As 
he refitted and reorganized his army in Charlotte, Cornwallis replaced his King’s 
Mountain losses with a division of Major General Alexander Leslie’s regulars from 
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Virginia and concentrated a 4,000-man strike force. After an unsuccessful attempt to 
eliminate Marion in early November, he decided to move north into North Carolina, 
destroy Greene’s army, and thereby crush the last remaining conventional military force. 
Cornwallis’ dilemma was that he had to disperse his units in order to “check the 
guerillas,” protect supply lines, and control the population; but by concentrating he 
completely relinquished control of the backcountry and his supply lines to partisans.90 
Cornwallis desperately needed to secure his vital rear-area sustainment network that 
extended from Charleston through the Low Country to his army before resuming the 
offensive (January 7, 1781). To regain freedom of action, he ordered Major Robert 
McLeroth’s 300-man 64th Regiment from Charleston to Kingstree, the seat of Marion’s 
district, to pacify the area between Nelson’s Ferry and the High Hills of the Santee (See 
Figures 3a and 3b). McLeroth briefly occupied Kingstree and reestablished the Santee 
River and Road communication between Charleston and Camden, which would serve as 
Cornwallis’ main supply and communication hub during his campaign. In early 
December, Rawdon ordered McLeroth to escort 200 fresh recruits of the 7th Regiment 
(Royal Fusiliers) from Sumter’s Great Savannah plantation, north along the Santee River 
Road (present-day Highway 76) to the High Hills of the Santee, where Major John 
Coffin’s 140 New York Volunteers would then escort them to Camden.91 Scouts who 
covered the northeastern Low Country circulated through Marion’s position at 
Shepherd’s Ferry to apprise him of McLeroth’s situation and whereabouts. He patiently 
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awaited the return of his partisans from their crop harvests and for an opportunity to 
strike. 
 Marion’s ambush of McLeroth’s column at Halfway Swamp signified his 
importance to Greene’s efforts and heralded his brigade’s successful transition from a 
partisan unit into the dominant regional conventional power. McLeroth’s Kingstree 
presence threatened to re-establish British control in northeastern South Carolina. His 
potential cooperation with Major James Cassells’ nearby 200-man Royal Militia at Great 
Savannah, and Major John Coffin’s 140 provincials at the High Hills might reverse 
Patriot success in the region.92 As McLeroth’s soldiers “leisurely” marched north along 
the Santee River Road through Halfway Swamp on December 12, at approximately 12 
p.m. a portion of Marion’s 700 partisans emerged from the dense surrounding wetlands 
and assaulted the rear of his column. After driving in the rear pickets, Marion deployed 
Captain William McCottry’s rifle company to suppress the rear guard with sustained fire 
as he directed two mounted assault elements to strike McLeroth’s flank and front. This 
well-coordinated ambush drove the 64th and the panicked Fusiliers northwestward into a 
field adjacent to the road, where McLeroth took cover and arrayed his men into a 
defensive posture behind a fence (See Figure 3c). Marion’s militia pursued, delivered 
sustained sniping fire on McLeroth’s pickets, and settled into a concealed position in the 
woodlands opposite the road from the British. As the fight began to develop, McLeroth 
sent Marion an officer with a flag of truce, protested the attack on his pickets, and 
challenged Marion to bring his men out of the woods and into the field for a fair fight. 
Marion replied that house burning was a worse crime than assaulting pickets, which he 
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planned to continue unabated in retaliation for British terror tactics. Marion hot-
bloodedly called McLeroth’s proposal an act of desperation, but accepted the challenge 
nonetheless. Both leaders agreed to select twenty of their best men to fight a pitched 
battle just south of an old oak tree in McLeroth’s field in order to minimize bloodshed.93 
 The contest was a ruse. Marion chose Major John Vanderhorst to lead twenty of 
his best partisans and delivered a motivational speech to the detachment before they 
moved onto the field. Vanderhorst’s team deployed into line of battle and closed to 
within 100 yards of McLeroth’s Redcoats, who then suddenly shouldered their arms and 
marched from the field. The confused partisans celebrated with loud shouts of 
“HUZZAH” as they occupied the field around sundown. McLeroth’s ploy was calculated 
to gain time and reinforcements. When Marion had begun the attack, McLeroth sent 
couriers to Coffin for assistance. Coffin received the couriers, but denied reinforcements 
in order to assume a strong defensive position behind nearby Swift Creek for fear of 
being ambushed himself. That evening, a detachment of McLeroth’s men built large 
bonfires and made noise as a diversion so that the main column could withdraw 
northward toward nearby Singleton’s Mill. The next morning Marion realized that he had 
been tricked, and sent Majors John James and Hugh Horry with 100 cavalry to intercept 
and hold McLeroth until his main force could catch up. James interdicted McLeroth by 
positioning his partisans among the Singleton Family’s houses on a high hill that covered 
the British escape route. After James’ snipers hit a British captain, they suddenly 
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discovered that the Singleton family had smallpox, and abandoned their position and the 
pursuit of the British. McLeroth subsequently escaped to Camden with six killed or 
wounded, including Captain George Kelly of the 64th Regiment; he reported that Marion 
lost “ten or a dozen” killed and wounded in the affair.94  
Halfway Swamp was pivotal because Marion won control of northeastern South 
Carolina’s key supply lines and civilian population as Cornwallis mobilized for his thrust 
into North Carolina in early January. Former Marine Scott Aiken diverges from 
historians who have trivialized Halfway Swamp. He points out that the ambush was 
Marion’s first engagement after Greene entered the fight, and that Marion’s 700 partisans 
won control of the Low Country between Georgetown and the High Hills of the Santee. 
Marion gained the ability to hold the Santee River and Road—he no longer had to retreat 
after attacking. He definitively denied Cornwallis his sustainment network at the critical 
juncture when he was compelled to completely abandon counterinsurgency operations 
and pursue Greene. Marion’s success also underscored to the 2000-to-3000 British 
residual forces remaining in South Carolina the danger of leaving their outposts 
undefended. William Dobein James, who was fifteen when he joined Marion, provides 
the only detailed primary account of Halfway Swamp. William James had close ties with 
Marion’s key officers and soldiers as a partisan and the son of Major John James. 
William gleaned the details of the Halfway Swamp action from his father and Captain 
Gavin Witherspoon, who was one of the twenty picked men under Vanderhorst.95 While 
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the scale of the ambush was irrelevant, some historians persist that James exaggerated the 
action.  
Historian Richard K. Showman suggests that James fabricated the Halfway 
Swamp story because Marion simply reported to Greene in his official correspondence 
that he had “skirmaged” with McLeroth, and did not mention the contest. Showman 
misses the point.  “Skirmishes” were highly relevant to the southern revolutionary war. 
Skirmish was the partisans’ term for the kind of fluid, Indian-style raiding and harassing 
tactics that defined irregular warfare. Marion also described his November Georgetown 
raid as a “scrummage,” and his partisans refer to a wide range of their well-known 
actions as skirmishes in their pension applications. William Kendle, for example, was a 
soldier under Majors Horry and James at Singleton’s Mill, and described the entire action 
as “a skirmish in which [the partisans] totally routed the British and Tories.” 
Unconventional warrior Mao Tse-tung significantly asserts that guerilla warfare has no 
“decisive battle[s],” but that “[t]he total effect of many local successes will be to change 
the relative strengths of the opposing forces.” At some juncture, he argues, guerillas 
“develop into orthodox forces” that cooperate with regular army units. Halfway Swamp 
anticlimactically added to the sum-total of Marion’s previous actions to tip the scales and 
shift the regional balance of power.96 Halfway Swamp was an asymmetric skirmish that 
broke the back of British regional dominance in a hybrid war where every action counted.   
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Lord Rawdon, who commanded the residual British force behind Cornwallis’ 
mobile army, clearly recognized the writing on the wall. Rawdon may not have known 
the details of the “contest,” but he painfully understood that McLeroth’s retreat amounted 
to partisan regional dominance. He angrily replaced McLeroth with Major John Campbell 
on December 17th, and reported to Cornwallis that: 
I must immediately dislodge Marion…so as to give our new party time to 
recollect themselves and to form, I think our interest would take a very 
different complexion from what it has hitherto borne…I think the scale 
would be decidedly in our favor, not perhaps from attachment to us, but 
from weariness of a long disquiet in which a contrary conduct has kept the 
district.97  
 
Marion’s presence prevented supply boats from ascending the Santee River to reach 
Camden, and forced British wagon trains to embark on the long, circuitous route from 
Monck’s Corner to Friday’s Ferry on the Congaree River. In short, Marion disrupted 
Rawdon’s ability to sustain Cornwallis, who was therefore compelled to forage widely 
and blindly grope his way into North Carolina in pursuit of Greene’s army (See Figure 
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3d). Greene was thrilled, and encouraged Marion to continue to “frighten the Tories…to 
desert the British.” The victory facilitated Greene’s strategy by enabling Whigs to join 
Greene and by denying Cornwallis Loyalist support. Furthermore, Halfway Swamp 
helped convince Cornwallis to keep the 300-man 64th Regiment at Camden to suppress 
partisans instead of using them for the invasion.98  
 Halfway Swamp allowed Marion’s partisans to consolidate their regional 
dominance. The well-timed mortal blow to British forces established the conditions 
necessary for Marion to effectively transition from guerilla to conventional warfare. 
Governor Rutledge rewarded Marion with an official promotion to brigadier general and 
command of all militia east of the Santee, Wateree, and Catawba Rivers—he now owned 
the entire Low Country in a bona fide capacity.99 In late December, Marion organized his 
volunteers into what became known as “Marion’s Brigade,” and appointed Colonel Peter 
Horry to command the cavalry. In conjunction with Greene’s campaign, Marion directed 
his adjutant, Captain John Postell, to seize anything of use to the British between Black 
Mingo and the mouth of the Pee Dee River, including slaves, boats, arms and 
ammunition, grains, and “provisions of any sort.” He further drained the swamp of 
ambient British support by ordering the arrest of able-bodied men who refused to provide 
assistance to the Patriot cause. William James referred to the period after December 1780 
as “the most interesting part” of Marion’s campaign because he “brought into action all 
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the energies of his officers and men.” For the first time since the British invasion, Marion 
cooperated with Lighthorse Harry Lee’s mounted Continental Legion, and together they 
nearly captured Georgetown, the eastern anchor of the British outposts.100 When Lee 
temporarily left the Low Country to help counter Cornwallis’ North Carolina invasion, 
Marion easily overwhelmed Lieutenant Colonel John Watson’s 500-man hunter-killer 
expedition of regulars and Tories, and chased them out of the Low Country and back into 
Camden (March 1781). Marion leveraged his success at Halfway Swamp like an 
experienced grappler who locks in a chokehold on his opponent; his skillfully measured 
application of force gave him the dominant position that ensured his success and doomed 
his enemy’s prospects.101 This regional power shift significantly undergirded Greene’s 
campaign.      
Marion helped create the conditions for Greene’s strategic victory. Halfway 
Swamp taught the raw 7th Fusiliers their peril and established their future tactical pattern. 
At Cowpens, the same Fusiliers contributed to Tarleton’s defeat by losing their nerve, 
firing prematurely, and charging in a loose formation at the decisive point of the battle. 
While not solely culpable, the Fusiliers’ performance helped precipitate the catastrophe 
that cost Cornwallis 120 dead and 900 captured soldiers.102 Furthermore, Marion’s efforts 
coupled with other Patriot raids in South Carolina to effectively vanquish the Royal 
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Militia who gathered provisions and cattle for Cornwallis. Stedman was compelled to 
force captured slaves to procure the Redcoats’ food from “abandoned” plantations around 
Winnsboro and Camden. When Cornwallis moved permanently into North Carolina, 
however, he burned his supply train and the 50,000 pounds of meal requisitioned by 
Stedman to more effectively surmount the poor roads, deep rivers, and partisan bands 
between his army and Greene’s. Marion’s Loyalist suppression and stranglehold on the 
Santee and Pee Dee Rivers helped to ensure that Cornwallis was neither able to re-
establish supply lines, or to recruit significant militia volunteers as he entered North 
Carolina.103 Greene’s hybrid strategy had visibly turned the tables. Marion’s dominance 
in South Carolina enabled North and South Carolinians to swell Greene’ s army at 
Guilford Courthouse to 4,400 men; and helped limit Cornwallis to 1,900 exhausted 
regulars. After Cornwallis “w[on] the sort of victory which ruins an army,” he limped 
with his 1,400 remaining Redcoats into Wilmington, North Carolina, and subsequently 
reported to Clinton that his catastrophic losses were mainly inflicted by skillfully 
deployed militia.104 Greene expelled Cornwallis from the Carolinas by executing a hybrid 
strategy that fully leveraged Marion’s asymmetric raids. 
Greene and Marion’s cooperation sealed the British fate in the South. From 
Wilmington, Cornwallis wrote to Clinton that Virginia was his last prospect for success 
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because his control of Carolina’s backcountry had been nonexistent for several months 
due to a complete lack of river communication and friendly inhabitants. His choice to 
stake everything on Virginia and abandon the Carolinas was strongly influenced by the 
prospect of Greene and Marion’s consolidation in partisan-controlled northeastern South 
Carolina.105 From Wilmington, Cornwallis explained the danger of re-entering South 
Carolina to American Secretary of State Lord George Germain:  
 The distance from hence to Camden…and the difficulty of passing the 
Pedee when opposed by an enemy render it utterly impossible for me to 
give…assistance, and I apprehend the possibility of the utmost hazard to 
this little corps…This might enable General Greene to hem me in among 
the great rivers and by cutting off our assistance render our arms 
useless…I have therefore under so many embarrassing 
circumstances…resolved to…march immediately into [Virginia]…to 
attempt a junction with General Phillips.106  
 
Marion produced the friction that stopped Cornwallis’ progress, sapped British war 
support, and energized the opposition. Despite Loyalist newspaper propaganda in British-
controlled coastal cities, Cornwallis, Whitehall, and the British public were aware that the 
Carolinas were lost. Max Boot explains that the democratic British Parliament 
necessitated unprecedented public war support. Powerful politicians like Sir Edmund 
Burke and Sir Jeffry Amherst articulated a strong public anti-war undercurrent and 
exploited Cornwallis’ difficulties. Burke and London Gazette readers who were tired of 
the war interpreted Cornwallis’ October, 1780 problems as evidence of failure. Before 
receiving news of Yorktown (October 19, 1781), Burke implied that Cornwallis had been 
compelled to “escape” the Carolinas. He even colluded with Henry Laurens, the former 
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Continental Congressional President who was imprisoned in the Tower of London, and 
distributed Laurens’ subversive essays among Parliament members.107 The salient second 
and third order effects of Greene’s successful hybrid strategy had significant geostrategic 
ramifications.              
Cornwallis’ retreat into Virginia allowed Greene to retake the Carolinas. As 
Greene entered South Carolina, he incorporated Marion’s Brigade into a more 
conventional army that captured Georgetown, cleared the remaining British from the 
interior, and re-established Patriot civil governance.108 Marion had started with only 
sixteen men, but regained the Low Country by leveraging warfare politically to weaken 
and break British control, which collapsed with a whimper at Halfway Swamp. He was 
careful never to tactically bite off more than he could chew, and gradually weakened the 
enemy politically and militarily with lightning raids at places of his time and choosing. 
Cornwallis’ impatient commanders naturally overreacted to Marion’s raids by abusing 
and alienating that very same population on whose support their success relied. While 
Clinton’s strategy looked good on paper and was embraced by the King and Whitehall, 
his operational lines of effort within South Carolina were poorly defined, arbitrarily 
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executed, and inconsistent with the desired end state of “Americanizing” the war. 
Cornwallis never seriously attempted to restore civil government, and his failure to re-
establish security corroded his efforts, strengthened Marion, and undermined domestic 
support. Greene’s only realistic option to beat the British was a strategy reliant upon 
politically-charged asymmetric raids because he began from a position of weakness. 
Marion facilitated Greene’s long-term goals by gaining the Low Country peoples’ hearts 
and minds, and control of its major river systems. Marion’s victories garnered the 
essential popular support that sustained Greene’s operations. Furthermore, Greene 
succeeded because he designed and directed a salient hybrid strategy that channeled the 
full potential of partisans like Marion. Cornwallis’ consistent overuse of blunt force wore 
out his army and played to the strengths of Greene and Marion, who cooperatively waged 
political warfare to overpower their British overlords.        
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CHAPTER 4 
Mind Over Matter: How John S. Mosby Overcame Political and Military Adversity to 
Achieve Perfect Asymmetry 
 
 John Singleton Mosby represented the best of the Army of Northern Virginia. He 
was born in Powhatan County to middling tobacco farmers. He grew up on a small 
Albemarle County farm, where he hunted, read classics, and attended school. When 
reading Parson Weems’ The Life of Marion as a boy, he “shouted aloud” as Marion 
outwitted the British. He developed into a small, ruthless, and resourceful man by facing 
bullies throughout his youth.113 Mosby moved to Bristol to practice law after he passed 
the bar and married Pauline Clarke in 1857. He was a “constitutional unionist” who 
supported the Confederate cause in 1861. His career skyrocketed after he became 
Colonel James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart’s scout in the 1st Virginia Cavalry. Mosby 
rose to colonel and command of the elite 43rd Partisan Ranger Battalion by 1864. His 
Rangers’ raids and ambushes of Union troop detachments behind enemy lines between 
1863 and 1865 arguably delayed Union victory for several months. Despite his 
remarkable contributions, narrow-minded Confederate War Department elites were 
unwilling to fully incorporate his Rangers into their strategic plans. Unlike Stuart, 
Confederate Major General Jubal Early largely ignored the potential of Mosby’s hit-and-
run attacks. In the fall of 1864, Early failed to recognize the opportunity to employ 
Mosby as a strategic enabler against Union Major General Philip Sheridan’s 
detachments and supply lines. The Shenandoah Valley spans roughly 165 miles from 
Lexington, in the south, to the Potomac River in the north, and is bound by the Allegany 
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Mountains to the West, and the Blue Ridge in the East (see Figure 4a). The Valley was a 
strategically vital invasion corridor and the Confederacy’s “breadbasket.” Early’s 
unwillingness to integrate Mosby’s Partisan Rangers into his Valley defensive plan 
contributed to his own strategic irrelevance and Cedar Creek defeat on October 19, 
1864. 
 The Valley situation was bleak for Early prior to Cedar Creek. The Union victory 
at Antietam (September 17, 1862) had allowed President Abraham Lincoln to issue the 
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862, which uprooted Confederate society 
by turning hundreds of thousands of former slaves against their masters in the wake of 
invading armies. Antietam, and the Union victories at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) and 
Vicksburg (July 4, 1863), strengthened Union resolve and prevented the chance of a 
European-brokered cease fire. Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Gettysburg 
casualties limited him to a mainly defensive strategy; and Major General Ulysses S. 
Grant’s Vicksburg victory had split the Confederacy, which denied the South vital 
western manpower, stock, and international communication. Lincoln made Grant the 
Union General-in-Chief in March 1864. Grant subsequently planned and executed a 
coordinated offensive of five Union armies across the South in May that inhibited the 
Confederate ability to shift soldiers between threatened areas.  
 Slowing Grant’s Overland Campaign through Virginia had cost the Army of 
Northern Virginia Major General Edward Johnston’s division and three corps 
commanders: Major Generals James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart, A.P. Hill, and James 
Longstreet. By June 1864, Major General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac had 
driven Lee’s army to the outskirts of Richmond and Petersburg, and Sherman was 
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besieging Atlanta. Both sides recognized the Valley as the essential support base and the 
back door to the Army of Northern Virginia. A successful Federal Valley conquest 
would deny the Army of Northern Virginia vital manpower and sustainment. More 
importantly, the conquest of the Charlottesville rail hub and the Virginia Central 
Railroad from the Valley would cut Lee’s rear communications, and thereby compel his 
abandonment of Richmond. Lee therefore tasked Early to take pressure off his besieged 
army by clearing the Valley and threatening Washington, D.C. Early’s Army of the 
Valley was successful until August 1864, when Sheridan’s 45,000-man Army of the 
Shenandoah won overwhelming victories at Winchester (September 19, 1864) and 
Fisher’s Hill (September 21-22, 1864). Early received reinforcements from Lee in mid-
October, but he needed every possible advantage to defeat Sheridan’s numerically 
superior army camped at Cedar Creek.114  
 Previous Confederate generals had successfully used unconventional Valley 
strategies. Confederate Major General John C. Breckinridge had demonstrated the 
effectiveness of an unconventional strategy against Major General Franz Sigel the 
previous May. With only 5,600 men, Breckinridge had evened the odds against Sigel’s 
9,500-man army with a hybrid combination of regular and irregular operations. 
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Breckinridge leveraged Mosby, Elijah (“Lige”) White, Harry Gilmore, and Hanse 
McNeill’s irregulars to swarm the flanks and rear of Sigel’s army with guerilla attacks. 
These irregulars turned the Valley into a gauntlet of constant guerilla hit-and-run attacks 
on Union supply lines, couriers, pickets, and cavalry detachments. As officially 
sanctioned officers who cooperated with Breckinridge’s regular army by leading locals 
in guerilla attacks against Sigel’s incursion, Mosby, Gilmore, White, and McNeill were 
partisans in the revolutionary mold of Brigadier General Francis Marion. Northerners 
dismissively called them “bushwhackers,” whereas southerners called these 
unconventional warriors “Partisan Rangers.” The Rangers’ asymmetric raids became 
southern legends and northern horror stories. They eliminated Sigel’s supply lines, 
demoralized his army, and decreased his line-of-battle strength by compelling him to 
detach large units to protect his wagon supply convoys, railroads, and couriers. 
Breckinridge’s coordinated hybrid strategy offset material inferiority by weakening and 
denying crucial intelligence to Sigel’s army.115 Before even closing with Breckinridge, 
Sigel reported that his “forces [were] insufficient for offensive operations in this country 
[the Valley], where the enemy is continuously on my flank and rear.”116 The full use of 
                                                 
115 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1984), 479-483; Ian F.W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerilla 
Warfare (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 43, 151; The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (cited 
hereafter as Official Records (OR)), vol. 27, part 3, 770-775; OR, series 1, vol. 37, part 
1, 2-5, 96, 384-386, 389, 390, 394-395; U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Conrad Crane, ed. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 109; Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla 
Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation, 2013), xx; Phillip Sheridan, The Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, vol. 
2. (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1992), 266. 
116 OR, series 1, vol. 37, part 1, 446-447. 
75 
 
 
 
Partisan Rangers thus enabled Breckinridge to concentrate 5,000 effectives to defeat 
Sigel’s significantly reduced 6,500-man mobile army at the Battle of New Market on 
May 15, 1864.117  
 Early took a different approach. Lee had sent Early’s 14,000-man Army of the 
Valley from Richmond into the Valley to defeat Major General David Hunter’s larger 
18,000-man force. After replacing Sigel, Hunter’s regenerated army had invaded the 
Valley; defeated a smaller Confederate army at Piedmont on June 5; damaged 
Staunton’s infrastructure; and burned the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and 
Governor John Letcher’s home in Lexington. Hunter menaced Lee’s rear when he 
reached the outskirts of Lynchburg and threatened the vital Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad. Luckily for Early, Partisan Rangers had crippled Hunter’s army by compelling 
him to completely abandon his supply lines. Early therefore attacked and drove away a 
weakened Union army at Lynchburg on June 18th that was plagued by guerillas; had 
foraged to meet supply requirements; lacked shoes in some units; and was critically low 
on ammunition. Notwithstanding, Early was unable or unwilling to acknowledge that 
Mosby and other partisans had facilitated the corrosive atmosphere that enabled his 
victory over Hunter from the Valley.118 After the war, Lee’s “bad old man” expressed 
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skepticism of Grant’s report that Hunter withdrew from Lynchburg because of a lack of 
ammunition: 
This is a little remarkable…Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so 
important an expedition with an insufficient supply of ammunition?...[He] 
tarried on the way for purposes which will hereafter appear, and when he 
reached there, his heart failed him and he was afraid to fight an inferior 
force…119 
 
Early was a West Pointer, a North Carolina attorney, and an inexperienced corps 
commander who had replaced A.P. Hill at the Battle of the Wilderness (May 5-7).120 He 
was no knight in shining armor, but his decisions as an independent commander 
demonstrated his preference for a conventional military strategy.  
 Early demonstrated indifference to Mosby’s painstaking efforts to facilitate his 
army’s raids on Washington, D.C., Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and subsequent Valley 
operations. He instead adhered to doctrinally accepted Napoleonic-style tactics, as 
exemplified by his actions at the Battle of Monocacy (July 9, 1864), in which he 
maneuvered tightly massed regiments like chess pieces on open battlefields. Mosby’s 
late mentor, JEB Stuart, had previously tasked Mosby to function as the Army of 
Northern Virginia’s eyes and ears, and to destroy railroads and supply lines behind 
Union lines in conjunction with Lee’s operations. In contrast, Early excluded Mosby 
from planning; sent him no written orders; and expressed apathy toward present and 
former Partisan Rangers mustered into his command.121 After Stuart was mortally 
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wounded at Yellow Tavern on May 11, Mosby reported directly to Lee. When Lee 
became preoccupied with Grant at Petersburg in the autumn of 1864, Mosby logically 
expected to cooperate with Early as he had with Stuart. Mosby later contrasted Lee and 
Stuart’s professionalism with Early’s unresponsiveness:  
Gen. Lee and Stuart always sent me written instructions, even by my own 
most trusted Lieutenants…[D]uring the time that Early was in the Valley I 
never at any time directly or indirectly received any message from him, 
oral or written…[h]e never communicated with me.122  
 
Early instead played to Union strengths by fighting conventionally without the proven 
advantage of partisan assistance. He was in no position to be persnickety, but 
squandered a key strategic enabler against superior forces. Although Mosby was 
sidelined in September by a combat wound during Winchester and Fisher’s Hill, his 
cooperation at Cedar Creek in October could have created greater opportunities for 
southern success.123 His Rangers had a well-deserved reputation as one of the elite 
Confederate units.124 Their tactical élan and psychological dominance over the invaders 
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was well established. One of Sheridan’s best cavalry commanders admitted that “[t]he 
guerillas, being few in numbers, mounted on fleet horses and thoroughly conversant 
with the country, had every advantage over my men.”125 Early’s unwillingness to 
leverage the Rangers is explainable by his lack of experience in independent command 
and the political climate.       
 Early reflected prevailing politics. The Confederate Government chose a 
conventional strategy in 1864 in the hope that a strategic defensive was sufficient to 
maintain military stalemates in Richmond and Atlanta. Continued stalemate would 
theoretically increase northern war weariness, and thereby influence northern voters to 
elect the Democratic Presidential Candidate George B. McClellan, who accepted his 
party’s “peace” platform in September.126 President Davis and other West Pointers had 
originally envisioned a strategy defined by conventional battles in the hope of gaining 
Confederate international legitimacy. However, the reality of Union-occupied territory, 
vast material inferiority, and the desire to control an alarming number of unauthorized 
guerilla bands compelled the Confederate adoption of a hybrid strategy in 1862. The 
War Department passed the Partisan Ranger Act on April 21, 1862, which authorized 
officers to independently raise Partisan Ranger commands from volunteers who lived 
among family and friends; operate behind enemy lines; and to arm and equip themselves 
with captured supplies. Despite the Partisan Act’s passage, Confederate Secretary of 
War James Randolph remained unified with the West Point-dominated establishment in 
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opposition to partisan warfare. The establishment basically perceived partisans as pirates 
who undermined conventional forces by encouraging regulars to desert to more 
attractive undisciplined guerilla units who plundered. Davis and Randolph therefore 
deliberately implemented the first Confederate Conscription Act on April 16, 1862, five 
days prior to the Partisan Ranger Act, to promote conventional warfare over guerilla 
warfare. Randolph also restricted guerilla recruitment by including the provision in the 
Partisan Act that Partisan Ranger unit creation required departmental commander 
approval; and General Orders no. 53, which prohibited further Partisan Ranger 
recruitment after July 31, 1862. Lee occasionally circumvented Confederate red tape by 
allowing the formation of legitimate guerilla units like Mosby’s, with the understanding 
that Rangers would remain under his control.127  
 American Revolutionary armies augmented by irregular militia had become 
unpopular with the West Point antebellum officer corps schooled in Napoleon Bonaparte 
and Henri Jomini. Historian William B. Skelton asserts that the Confederate War 
Department’s conventional mindset reflected the officer corps’ antebellum 
professionalization. Stuart had valued the Ranger’s contributions as Mosby’s mentor and 
ally. However, he was also a West Pointer who was fully cognizant that his cohorts 
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would negatively perceive Mosby’s unit. When Mosby was promoted to Captain and 
awarded with an independent command in March 1863, Stuart cautioned him to: 
[B]y all means ignore the term “Partizan Ranger.” It is in bad repute. Call 
your command “Mosby’s Regulars,” and it will give it a tone of meaning 
and solid worth…You will have to be very much on your guard against 
incorporating in your command deserters from other branches of the 
service.128 
 
Mosby idolized Stuart, but realized that “spoils” were a prime recruitment incentive, and 
defiantly referred to his unit as Partisan Rangers. He was authorized to operate 
asymmetrically on detached duty but required to wear regular uniforms and follow 
Stuart and Lee’s orders and army regulations. Previous units had given Partisan Rangers 
a bad image. Throughout 1862, the Confederate Government received complaints of 
regular soldier desertion to irregular units, as well as angry complaints from civilians in 
Missouri, Tennessee, and North Carolina who had allegedly been terrorized and 
plundered by Confederate “bushwhackers” like William Quantrill and Bill Anderson. 
“Bushwhackers” were home-grown, civilian-clad, self-constituted guerillas known for 
their atrocities.129 Historian James McPherson points out that Quantrill’s raid on 
Lawrence, Kansas, in which Missouri “Rangers” killed 150 people and destroyed an 
abolitionist stronghold in August 1863, created a public uproar that “gave all guerillas a 
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bushwhacker image.”130 Mosby and McNeill’s units maintained excellent reputations in 
spite of the bad press. Lee and Stuart had always coordinated with Mosby and had given 
him clear instructions because they recognized that he was a combat multiplier. Early 
was altogether different. Mosby was compelled to “guess” at Early’s intentions to 
facilitate his army’s strategy without any clear guidance.131 Early therefore failed to fully 
utilize a powerful asset against a superior foe. 
 Sheridan meant business. Early’s Washington and Chambersburg raids had 
created the public furor necessary for Grant to formulate an aggressive Valley strategy. 
Halleck consolidated the formerly disparate military departments of Washington, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia into the Middle Military Division at Grant’s 
suggestion. Grant put Sheridan in command of the Middle Military Division, who 
immediately organized the mobile 45,000-man Army of the Shenandoah to accomplish 
the task of clearing the Valley of all enemy forces and “forage and subsistence” to 
render it “untenable.” Grant was confident in Sheridan’s ability to execute a “hard war” 
strategy that denied Lee the Valley’s resources, and to follow Early “to the death.”132 
Historian Mark Grimsley points out that over the course of the war, Lincoln effectively 
shifted from a “conciliatory” policy (1861) that respected southern Constitutional rights, 
to a “hard war” policy meant “to demoralize southern civilians” and destroy the 
Confederate economy. Former Union General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck had vacillated 
on counterinsurgency policy by allowing department commanders to handle guerillas 
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with varied severity. Grant finally refined and incorporated those existing policies into 
his overall strategy.133 Sheridan took command on August 6th and began planning the 
Army of the Valley’s destruction, but he never formulated an effective solution to the 
guerilla problem. Mosby’s Berryville Wagon Raid on August 13 inaugurated sustained 
Ranger operations against Sheridan’s supply lines and detachments that continued 
indefinitely. After Berryville, Sheridan set the tone by following orders to hang Rangers 
without trial, arrest their families, and “destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes, 
and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms.”134 Not until Sheridan 
decisively defeated Early, however, did he make a concerted effort against the guerillas. 
Early would have benefited from acknowledging that despite Sheridan’s best counter-
guerilla measures, the 43rd Ranger Battalion continued to grow and maintain the tactical 
initiative.135 He instead effectively ignored Mosby’s locally rooted, thriving, well-
organized, and available guerilla force that literally surrounded him.       
 Mosby’s 43rd Virginia Cavalry Battalion consisted of roughly 800 hand-picked 
cavalrymen who dominated the area of Northern Virginia known as “Mosby’s 
Confederacy.” Mosby’s Confederacy (see Figure 4b) was the region around Loudon, 
Fauquier, Fairfax, and Prince William Counties, which included the Bull Run and Blue 
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Ridge Mountains, and the adjacent lower Shenandoah Valley. His Rangers’ sustained 
raids on enemy outposts, pickets, couriers, detachments, supply lines, and patrols created 
a corrosive environment that destabilized the Union occupation. Historian James 
Ramage asserts that “the night belonged to Mosby” in Northern Virginia because his 
raids created fear in soldiers’ minds as a force multiplier, and compelled Union 
commanders to inordinately detail soldiers from front-line service to logistical and rear 
area security, as well as counter-guerilla operations.136 Mosby defined his own 
operational concept:  
My purpose was to weaken the armies invading Northern Virginia, by 
harassing their rear. As a line is only as strong as its weakest point, it was 
necessary for it to be stronger than I was at every point, in order to resist 
my attacks…To destroy supply trains, to break up the means of conveying 
intelligence, and thus isolating an army from its base, as well as its 
different corps from each other, to confuse their plans by capturing 
despatches, are the objects of partisan war…My men had no camps. If 
they had gone into camp, they would soon have all been captured. They 
would scatter for safety, and gather at my call, like the Children of the 
Mist.137 
 
Herman Melville rode with the Union cavalry at Aldie in April 1863. His description of 
the Rangers’ terrible presence among the hostile population corroborates Mao’s 
assertion that the civilian population is “the sea in which the insurgent swims:”  
Unarmed none cared to stir abroad      
For berries beyond their forest-fence:      
As glides in seas the shark,      
Rides Mosby through Green dark 138  
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Southerners contrastingly lauded Rangers as heroic symbols of defiance as Federal 
incursions forged Confederate identity and nationalism. Union scorched earth tactics 
alienated civilians, who in turn sheltered, fed, equipped, informed, and augmented the 
Ranger Battalion. Mosby’s Rangers leveraged equestrian and marksmanship expertise, 
intimate knowledge of the mountains, night attacks, and the element of surprise to offset 
numerical inferiority. Civilians among the hills and dales constituted the shadow support 
network from which the Rangers harassed, attacked, and gobbled up isolated 
detachments and stragglers before eluding superior forces.139 Rangers infested the Bull 
Run and Blue Ridge Mountains like sharks who emerged from a hostile abyss to strike 
and quickly carry away terrified victims without a trace. 
 The Rangers’ reputation for invincibility added to their mystique. Mosby had 
gained renown as Stuart’s scout in 1862. However, his thirty-man raid at Fairfax 
Courthouse on March 9, 1863 that bagged Brigadier General Edwin H. Stoughton 
established his partisan career.140 After being rewarded with an independent command, 
his Rangers became famous for destroying larger Federal Cavalry detachments who 
brought sabers to gun fights. Mosby reflected that he “was the first cavalry commander 
who discarded the saber as useless…my command reached the highest point of 
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efficiency as cavalry because they were well armed with two six-shooters and their 
charges combined the effect of fire and shock.” The Rangers proved more than a match 
for Federal Cavalry man-for-man. At Chantilly in March 1863, for example, Mosby’s 
fifty-man detachment rode through and destroyed a 200-man Federal Cavalry column 
with a rapid and high volume of six-shot, single action, .44 caliber Army Colt revolver 
fire (see Figure 4c) with no loss of Ranger life. Mosby’s engagement at Miskel’s Farm 
on April 2, 1863 further established his tactical dominance. Union observers from across 
the Potomac were shocked when they witnessed Mosby’s force of seventy surrounded 
guerillas gain fire superiority, empty two dozen saddles, and capture eighty prisoners 
and 100 fully equipped horses from the “elite” 150-man First Vermont cavalry troop. 
Mosby’s aggressive combination of covert raids and small pitched battles like Chantilly 
and Miskel’s Farm elicited the Staunton Speculator’s report that Mosby “had lately been 
stirring up the Yankees with a sharp stick,” and earned Mosby the respect of Stuart, Lee, 
and the Confederate people. Lee increasingly realized Mosby’s potential, and 
enthusiastically authorized his creation of the 43rd Cavalry Battalion when he derailed 
an Orange and Alexandria (O & A) Railroad train on May 30, 1863. If Early never 
acknowledged Mosby’s talent, Sheridan certainly did.141 
 Early “lacked [both] the courage of his [own] convictions” and any appreciation 
for the Ranger’s potential. Mosby wrote after the war that “I had always to guess at what 
                                                 
141 Mosby, Reminiscences, 39, 92; Mosby, Memoirs, chapters 2-3, 285; Unknown, 
“Raids into the Enemy’s Lines,” The Staunton Spectator, April 7, 1863, Historic 
American Newspapers, Library of Congress, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov; OR, 
series 1, vol. 33, part 1,1081-1082; Lee to Davis, April 4, 1863, John S. Mosby, The 
John Singleton Mosby Papers, 1855-1922, photocopies. Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond; Jones, Ranger Mosby, 173-175. 
86 
 
 
 
he [Early] wanted me to do-that he never once ordered or requested me to do 
anything.”142 Like any good officer, in 1864 Mosby took initiative in the absence of 
Early’s clear guidance or coordination. After “moving his command “east of the Blue 
Ridge for the purpose of cooperating” with Early, Mosby created a diversion at Point of 
Rocks on the Potomac River with 250 Rangers that allowed Early to invade Maryland 
downstream without incident on July 4, 1864. He then severed the Federal Railroad and 
telegraph lines between Washington and Harper’s Ferry to facilitate Early’s subsequent 
investment of Maryland Heights. Because Mosby was physically unable to reach Early 
in Maryland to receive oral instructions, he temporarily resumed operations in Virginia 
as the Army of the Valley raided toward Washington. 
 Mosby’s victory over Major William H. Forbes’ elite 150-man Federal cavalry 
detachment at Mount Zion Church in a pitched battle reinforced the superiority of the 
pistol over the saber, ended Federal patrols around Aldie for several weeks, and 
temporarily restricted Federal columns to the main roads within Mosby’s 
Confederacy.143 Without any commendations or clear instructions, Mosby continued to 
attempt to cooperate with Early before and after Sheridan’s Valley offensive began on 
August 10, 1864.144 Detached and denied strategic integration, Mosby waged a private 
war against Sheridan: 
The main object of my campaign was to vex and embarrass Sheridan and, 
if possible, to prevent his advance into the interior of the state. But my 
exclusive attention was not given to Sheridan, for alarm was kept up 
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continuously by threatening Washington and occasionally crossing the 
Potomac.145  
 
Mosby certainly vexed Sheridan, but his admission that his “exclusive attention was not 
given to Sheridan” indicates the extent to which his operations lacked coordination with 
conventional military leaders. Sheridan confessed that Mosby was the “most 
redoubtable” guerilla leader because he “depleted [Sheridan’s] line-of-battle strength 
[by] necessitating…large escorts for…[his] supply-trains,” but imagine if the raids had 
been coordinated.146 Although Mosby was absent from a combat wound between 
September 13th and 29th, his subordinate commanders were proven leaders who routinely 
conducted raids independently. In Mosby’s absence, Early could have easily cooperated 
with Captain Sam Chapman, who was a skilled tactician and Mosby’s second-in-
command. The fact that the Rangers momentarily floundered without Mosby was no 
reason for Early to write them off.147 Early or one of his subordinate commanders could 
certainly have taken charge of the Rangers without Mosby, and focused their 
unconventional combat power on Sheridan’s rear at either Winchester or Fisher’s Hill.     
 The Rangers demonstrated their destructive potential in no uncertain terms at 
Berryville. The Berryville Wagon Raid was Mosby’s signature asymmetric ambush. 
Sheridan began maneuvering a 35,000-man army from Harper’s Ferry to destroy Early’s 
Confederate Army located near Winchester on August 10. Mosby’s scouts under John 
Russell apprised him of Sheridan’s disposition and long supply train that stretched from 
Washington through Berryville to his army. With fresh intelligence, Mosby initiated the 
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movement of three cavalry squadrons (troops in today’s language) to a temporary secret 
rendezvous position near Berryville. Mosby then personally scouted the Berryville Pike 
(modern-day Highway 7) just north of Berryville to select his ambush site and the 
“knoll” that became the assault position. He retrieved his Rangers in the early morning 
hours, led them on a concealed route toward the ambush site, and arrayed them 
undetected in their assault positions. He assigned Captain Adolphus (“Dolly”) Richards’ 
squadron to attack the convoy where it entered Berryville; while Captains Sam Chapman 
and Alfred Glasscock’s squadrons were tasked to attack the rear. As the soldiers, 
teamsters, and sutlers rested, made coffee, and slowly rose to the dawn twilight around 
their wagons, Mosby personally scouted and surmised the vulnerability of the strung-out 
and unsecured rear of the convoy along the pike.  
 Mosby and his subordinate commanders positively identified their targets and 
confirmed the feasibility of the attack. Satisfied, and with his squadrons set in their 
assault positions, Mosby personally initiated the ambush with the signal of three 
howitzer shots into the convoy. His Rangers were shrouded by mist and therefore 
completely surprised the enemy (See Figure 4d). In characteristic fashion, Mosby’s 250-
to-300 Rangers “dashed forward ‘as reapers descend to the harvest of death’ with pistols 
and ‘demoniac yells.’” Union Brigadier General John R. Kenley, who commanded the 
3,000-man escort brigade and convoy, recognized the danger too late to deploy, and a 
large portion of his terrified men were routed as Rangers rode through the clustered 
wagons as the sun rose. Kenly’s men panicked and fled as the Rangers quickly 
“unhitch[ed] mules, burn[ed] wagons, and hurr[ied] prisoners and spoils to the rear.” 
Then, as quickly as they had appeared, Mosby’s skirmishers executed a rear-guard 
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action to cover the Rangers’ retreat across the Shenandoah River. With the loss of only 
“two dead and three wounded,” Mosby’s men killed six and wounded nine men, and 
escaped through Snicker’s Gap with 200 prisoners, 420 mules, 200 cattle, and 36 
horses.148 Mosby was the guerilla par excellence, and Berryville was his asymmetric 
masterpiece. 
 Mosby dealt Sheridan a political bloody nose at Berryville that reinvigorated 
Confederate morale. Although his raid was comparatively small, Sheridan could ill-
afford embarrassments in the politically hostile context of the upcoming presidential 
election. Momentum had been with the North when Grant began the Overland 
Campaign, but Democratic Presidential Candidate George McClellan increasingly 
appealed to northerners disheartened by Grant’s failure to destroy Lee outside 
Richmond, and Sherman’s apparent stalemate at Atlanta. As Lincoln’s arch-nemesis, 
McClellan grudgingly took charge of both “War Democrats” and “Peace Democrats” 
known as “copperheads.” Copperhead politicians and editorialists who routinely made 
capital of Union failures had a field day with Berryville.149 Major newspapers 
embellished reports of the panic-stricken guards who threw down their weapons, and 
even falsely claimed that the Rangers had caused Sheridan’s subsequent retrograde 
movement north to Halltown.150 Harper’s Weekly inaccurately reported that: 
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In the Valley Early has been quite heavily reinforced by General 
Longstreet, and has taken a strong position south of Strasburg. This, 
together with a partial defeat at Berryville on the 14th, in which Sheridan’s 
wagon train was as completely destroyed as to embarrass his operations, 
has led the latter to fall back upon Winchester.151 
   
The New York Times played into Mosby’s hands by calling him “the only aggressive 
enemy in the Military Division.”152 Mosby’s sensationalized cost-efficient raid 
embarrassed and frustrated Sheridan’s efforts, demoralized his army, and encouraged 
northern political opposition. Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, lamented 
in late August that the “fault finding which has disgraced the presses ostensibly of the 
administration party, particularly the press of New York has given strength to their 
opponents.” The Rangers’ spectacularly lop-sided success was conversely a boon to 
southern morale that was sensationalized by the southern press.153 The humiliated 
Sheridan reacted with severity.  
 Although economical, Mosby’s attacks provoked the Army of the Shenandoah’s 
wrath. His Rangers at Berryville had temporarily discredited Sheridan and tied down 
three times their number of Union soldiers. Sheridan permanently tasked an 1,800-man 
brigade to perform convoy security, and required that couriers be escorted by eight-to-
ten cavalrymen. He later described the challenge posed by guerillas: 
During the entire campaign, I had been annoyed by guerilla bands…and 
this had considerably depleted my line-of-battle strength, necessitating as 
it did large escorts…The most redoubtable of these leaders was 
Mosby…154 
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Mosby had penetrated Sheridan’s psyche and germinated apprehension about his supply 
lines’ vulnerability within the Valley. Sheridan responded with more aggressive counter-
guerilla measures than any previous commander. He dedicated a company of scouts 
under the Indian fighter Captain Richard Blazer to conduct hunter-killer patrols 
exclusively for Rangers. His large cavalry corps also allowed him to task a large force to 
screen his army, with special instructions to surveille the Blue Ridge gaps and the 
Shenandoah River fords that were known Ranger ratlines. He additionally ordered the 
arrest of Rangers’ family members, and condoned his subordinates’ summary execution 
of captured guerillas.155 Sheridan’s counter-guerilla operations damaged the 43rd 
Battalion and kept Mosby on his toes, but ultimately neither prevented raids, or 
eliminated the guerilla menace. Mosby’s Rangers under Captain Chapman sustained 
operations as Mosby convalesced, and by October Mosby was again leading the 
battalion in aggressive operations against Sheridan’s rear.156  
 Sheridan no longer perceived Early as a major threat after his Winchester and 
Fisher’s Hill victories virtually destroyed the Army of the Valley. His guerilla woes 
continued, however. The Rangers’ renewed railroad destruction was the only bright spot 
in the Valley campaign for Lee. Mosby’s spectacular raids on the Manassas Gap 
(October 6) and Baltimore and Ohio (October 13) Railroads were stark reminders to 
Grant and Sheridan that the Valley had yet to be conquered. Despite Sheridan’s best 
efforts, the Rangers ensured that the Manassas Gap Railroad would never be utilized by 
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the Army of the Shenandoah for any offensive.157 Sheridan therefore remained 
obstinately opposed to Grant’s suggestion that he ascend the Valley, destroy the Virginia 
Central Railroad, attack Charlottesville, and threaten Lee’s rear. Grant believed that such 
an offensive would break the Richmond stalemate and shorten the war. Sheridan was not 
opposed to Grant’s suggestion because of Early’s army, but the threat of guerillas to his 
supply lines! Sheridan reported to Grant that although “Early’s army was completely 
broken up and dispirited…, [i]t [would] be exceedingly difficult for [him] to carry the 
infantry column over the mountains and strike at the Central road. [He] [could not] 
accumulate sufficient stores to do so…” In Sheridan’s mind, his own victories on the 
heels of Sherman’s Atlanta conquest (September 2) were sufficient to ensure Lincoln’s 
reelection. Averse to further risks, he therefore determined that his two victories and 
scorched-earth campaign from Staunton to Winchester were good enough for 
government work. He furthermore wanted no part of a renewed campaign in which 
guerillas might prevent the success of an assault on Charlottesville by weakening his 
army. Sheridan thus remained stubbornly determined to let well enough alone by 
remaining in the lower Valley and returning part of his army to Grant.158  
 Major General Early meanwhile typified the adage that “you cannot expect a 
tiger to change his stripes.” Lee again reinforced Early to 21,000 men after he had nearly 
lost his entire army. He had faced such odds before, and was not about to change tactics. 
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Mosby was back in the saddle, aggressively campaigning, and willing “to follow orders” 
as Early prepared to attack Sheridan in October. Early predictably told Mosby nothing of 
his plans. The Army of the Valley’s well-executed Cedar Creek attack unfolded without 
a hitch on October 19 as Major General John Brown Gordon’s strike force completely 
surprised, flanked, and routed two of Sheridan’s corps around 5:30 am. When Early 
halted the Confederate pursuit of Sheridan’s apparently defeated army, few could have 
predicted what would happen next. There were no significant guerilla detachments in the 
Valley between Sheridan’s routed army and Winchester. After all, nobody had informed 
Mosby, the last significant Partisan Ranger commander, of Early’s plans. If any Rangers 
were in the vicinity, they obviously failed to notice a splendidly mounted two-star 
general who was riding furiously toward the battlefield and cursing a blue streak—
ordering his panicked Bluecoats to face about, fall in, and pursue the enemy. Sheridan’s 
leadership electrified his army, which subsequently counterattacked and destroyed 
Early’s army that afternoon once and for all. The Confederate government’s 
conventional mindset and Early’s inability or unwillingness to embrace hybrid warfare 
ensured that Mosby’s elite Rangers were everywhere but in the rear of Sheridan’s army 
at one of the Civil War’s most critical junctures. Early refused to focus the Ranger’s 
combat power on Sheridan’s Achilles heel, because “By God, [he] wasn’t going to do all 
the fighting while Mosby did the plundering.” The Rangers never gobbled up Sheridan. 
Instead they were all over Northern Virginia because an inept, conventionally minded 
general refused to coordinate with them or to lead them.159 
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 Mosby had always waged a political war to simply justify his existence. He and 
McNeill were the lone exceptions to President Davis’ euphemistic reflection that 
Partisan Rangers who he initially commissioned were “subsequently confined to cavalry 
alone.”160 West Pointer Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser was Early’s brave and dull 
cavalry commander. He disliked guerillas because Ranger Hanse McNeill and former 
Ranger Colonel Lige White had both refused to comply with some of his petulant 
demands and unreasonable orders.161 Rosser had sent Lee an angry letter in January 
1864 calling “Partisan Rangers” inefficient, detrimental to good order and discipline, 
and a menace to civilians that provoked Union wrath. Apart from Mosby and McNeill, 
Lee and Secretary of War Seddon agreed, and pressured Congress to repeal the Partisan 
Ranger Act in February 1864. Lee appreciated Mosby and McNeill, but was himself a 
proponent of Napoleon-style heavy battalions, and never acknowledged the value of 
Ranger small unit operations characterized by 20-to-100 men for purposes of speed, 
stealth, secrecy, infiltration, and surprise. Stuart praised Mosby’s exploits and vouched 
for the Rangers’ “efficiency” to shield Mosby’s command, but he was also 
unsympathetic to small unit operations, and had even attempted to muster Mosby’s 
command into regular service at Lee’s request. Lee and Stuart had believed that they 
were doing Mosby and McNeill favors; as West Pointers they were oblivious to the 
importance of spoils and small unit operations to Ranger cohesion and efficiency. Lee 
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had sent a letter to Stuart in response to rumors of Mosby’s men profiteering from 
plunder. He professed knowledge of Mosby’s large command, but could not fathom why 
Mosby “under[took] his expeditions with so few men, whether it is from policy or the 
difficulty of collecting them.” Mosby and McNeill ultimately protected their commands 
by traveling to Richmond to secure policy exemptions.162 In the wake of the political 
bloodbath and repeated invasions, Mosby’s “battalion of six companies was the only 
authorized [guerilla] force operating in the rear of Sheridan’s army in the Shenandoah 
Valley” by the fall of 1864.163  
 Ranger operations the week after Cedar Creek bore testimony to Mosby’s 
deferred dream and capability to influence Early’s campaign. After the battle, Mosby 
approached one of Early’s staff members in Charlottesville to ask why Early had not 
notified him of his plans to attack Sheridan at Cedar Creek. Mosby told the staff officer 
that he “could have struck him [Sheridan] in the rear-destroyed his trains in the rout & 
confusion-& probably created such a [ferment?] that they could not-have reformed…”164 
He was not exaggerating. After Cedar Creek, Mosby and 400 Rangers infiltrated the 
Valley on the night of October 24th, and successfully attacked another wagon train six 
miles north of Winchester on the 25th. The Rangers captured Union General Alfred 
N.A. Duffie during the ambush. While Sheridan downplayed the incident, continued 
battalion-sized Ranger raids in the Bull Run and Shenandoah Valleys only reinforced his 
refusal to shorten the war by attacking Charlottesville. In addition to numerous 
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unauthorized guerilla units throughout the Valley, by December 1864 the 43rd Battalion 
grew to eight companies. Mosby demonstrated that Early’s refusal to coordinate with the 
Rangers and enlist their help to influence the Cedar Creek battle was a grievous error.165 
His failure to follow Stuart and Breckinridge’s example of employing the full spectrum 
of available forces might have cost him the most decisive battle of the Valley Campaign. 
Mosby intentionally understated the case when he reflected that Early “preferred for 
Sheridan to keep his wagon trains.”166          
 Mosby defied political and military odds with remarkable success. He 
transcended conventional tactics and re-discovered guerilla principles as old as warfare 
itself by striving for excellence. As an outsider to the West Point clique, his 
unconventional rise as a partisan chieftain was perceived as a threat by the jealous and 
small-minded elements of the elitist Confederate power structure who were dedicated to 
maintaining the status quo. Stuart was a true ally who recognized Mosby’s potential and 
enabled his success. By running with opportunities, Mosby’s Rangers became a force 
multiplier that ultimately earned the respect and admiration of Stuart, Lee, and the 
Confederate people. Mosby and McNeill managed to save their commands from jealous 
elites through proven good conduct and efficiency. Following Stuart’s death and Lee’s 
increasingly desperate situation between the summer to the winter of 1864, Mosby’s 
operational lines of effort became largely detached from the strategic situation. As 
Union offensives ground down the Confederate Army, less experienced commanders 
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lacked the imagination and strategic acumen of men like Stuart. Early’s monolithic 
devotion to conventional warfare ensured that Mosby’s command would become 
disengaged as a strategic enabler. Early imprudently dealt the Rangers out of his crucial 
Valley operations. He thereby quickened his defeat at Cedar Creek by ignoring available 
unconventional forces capable of creating military opportunities. Sheridan’s victory over 
Early and brutal Valley suppression paradoxically stoked the flames of Mosby’s 
command, which eluded occupiers and executed raids indefinitely. Following the Army 
of the Valley’s destruction, only the Rangers prevented Sheridan from taking 
Charlottesville from the Valley. Mosby mastered asymmetric warfare and delayed 
Union victory, but his efforts were in vain “without a good army to take advantage of 
[his] success.”167 
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Figure 4a:168        The Shenandoah Valley and Mosby’s Confederacy 
 
Figure 4b:169                           Mosby’s Confederacy Proper 
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Figure 4c:170                            Colt .44 Six-shot Revolver 
 
Figure 4d: 
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Conclusion 
Marion and Mosby’s combat power stemmed from their ability to adapt guerilla 
principles to regional cultural, political, and socioeconomic conditions. As material 
underdogs, they achieved asymmetric mastery by leveraging local resources and 
mounted guerilla tactics against larger, better-equipped adversaries. Civilian 
communities who viewed them as resistance symbols provided the essential support 
structure for their success as enemy occupations forged nationalism. Their fluid forces 
thrived among the swamps, mountains, and sympathetic populace who provided them 
refuge, food, supplies, intelligence, and manpower. They won popular support with 
dedication, political savvy, tactical skill, and economy of force. Marion and Mosby 
adhered to ancient principles used by Genghis Khan and Shun Tzu. They avoided 
superior forces and enemy strongpoints in favor of isolated units and weak points. They 
targeted military infrastructure, supply convoys, isolated troop detachments, pickets, 
couriers, and elements of the population who supported the enemy. Their attacks 
weakened larger armies by logistically disrupting supply and communication; corroding 
enemy troop morale and domestic war support; and diverting enemies’ line-of-battle 
strength by compelling them to protect supply lines, outposts, and detachments. As 
efficient partisans, their political and informational impacts created irrational fear in 
their enemies’ minds, and were sensationalized by soldiers, politicians, and the print 
media. They became exponentially more effective than comparably sized regular units 
by exploiting their own legends and psychologically dominating their enemies by using 
fear as a force multiplier. While objective historians acknowledge their proficiency, 
Mosby’s legend was tainted by the slave power defeat and association with Confederate 
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bushwhackers. Marion became a hero as his militia was incorporated into a winning 
strategy. Mosby’s 1864 operations contrastingly remained a bright spot in Virginia’s 
dismal war effort, partly because his Rangers’ spirit represented something more 
American than Richmond’s elite establishment.     
 The divergence of Confederate ideology and goals from original American 
republican-based values shaped Richmond’s political and military policies. The 
Southern Campaign of the American Revolution had been part of a radical movement 
with a democratic groundswell of citizen-militia support for the Patriot cause. Greene 
achieved victory in the South not from his Continentals’ strength, but by designing and 
directing a salient hybrid strategy that channeled the power of a people’s war. He 
overcame superior numbers by incorporating partisans like Marion, who knew the 
terrain and had earned the people’s loyalty, into a hybrid strategy that systematically 
incorporated guerilla tactics. President Davis’ Confederate War Department had a 
different political philosophy and strategic vision. The Richmond elite sought to 
preserve slavery and the social order by promoting a deferential society that suppressed 
political parties, and protected southern institutions and infrastructure with a 
conventional army. Elite-driven conscription created a grand professional army and 
tactics that limited guerilla warfare’s potential to create anarchy. In the balance, 
Confederate tactics were never grand enough to cope with Union advantages, so 
partisans like Mosby and McNeill coped by irregular means.  
Mosby, like Marion, was an underdog who became Virginia’s master of partisan 
warfare. Yet Marion had more significantly influenced the Southern Campaign. Greene 
integrated him into the overall strategy by providing written orders, a sense of purpose, 
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and by nesting his partisan raids into overall strategy. Coordinated actions allowed 
Marion’s ambush of Major Robert McLeroth at Halfway Swamp on December 12, 1780 
to create a power shift which denied Cornwallis his military base-of-support, 
reinvigorated Greene’s, and thereby facilitated Continental victory. In 1863, Mosby was 
rewarded with a command after proving guerilla warfare’s feasibility, despite 
technological advancements and military professionalization. Lee and Stuart utilized his 
Rangers much like Greene had Marion. As the Spring 1864 Union offensive removed 
competent southern leaders, commanders like Early steeped in West Point doctrine were 
loath to embrace hybrid warfare, even when all other options were exhausted. As 
Northern Virginia’s last officially sanctioned partisan leader, Mosby not only proved his 
capability to cooperate at Berryville on August 13, 1864, but even prolonged the war by 
influencing Sheridan not to advance through the Shenandoah Valley to attack the 
strategically vital Charlottesville rail hub behind Lee’s army. Unlike Greene, Early 
chose not to coordinate with Mosby and avoided hybrid warfare, apparently because of 
his overinflated elitist sense of pride, as well as inexperience and incompetence. Early’s 
irrational refusal to employ Mosby indicates that oligarchic Confederate elitism under 
the stress of war created strategic inflexibility that resulted in catastrophes like Cedar 
Creek, a factor in southern defeat.   
 Marion was a revolutionary hero in a war that democratically embraced grass-
roots support; Mosby was an indominable American who became a controversial figure 
in a slave society’s failed independence movement. While Stuart lived and the Army of 
Northern Virginia maneuvered, Mosby made important strategic contributions. The peak 
strength and efficiency of the Rangers tragically coincided with Stuart’s death and Lee’ 
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hopeless defense of Richmond. In contrast to Greene, Early’s Army of the Valley 
command team substituted arrogance for inferiority. Early foolishly shuffled the 
Rangers, his last ace, out of his deck. Like Marion, Mosby only needed broad guidance 
and written orders delivered by a trusted courier to coordinate his actions, which Early 
obviously knew. Mosby was on the losing side, and defeat shaped his contentious 
historiography. Recent scholarship, however, testifies to his legacy as a high-caliber 
guerilla like Marion. Both demonstrated that the ancient art of guerilla warfare will 
always remain a viable strategic option for weaker nations under the right circumstances, 
terrain, conditions, and with the right people. Mosby was a true partisan whose impact 
was limited by the constraints of oligarchic leadership whose narrow interests set the 
political agenda and defined a bridle, inflexible strategy. As Marion demonstrated, 
however, no military on earth is sufficiently powerful to suppress a truly democratic 
movement and a real people’s war.   
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